

Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

MARCH 1971

AFRICA, 1971

THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN AFRICA <i>W. A. E. Skurnik</i>	129
POPULATION PRESSURE IN TROPICAL AFRICA <i>Thomas E. Dow, Jr.</i>	136
FRANCOPHONE AFRICA <i>William H. Lewis</i>	142
THE FUTURE OF AFRICA SOUTH <i>Christian P. Potholm</i>	146
THE ETHIOPIAN PERPLEX <i>Barbara A. Alpert</i>	151
THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA <i>David J. Murray</i>	157
POLITICS AND FACTIONALISM IN GHANA . <i>Richard Rathbone</i>	164
BOOKS ON AFRICA	168
CURRENT DOCUMENTS • <i>State of the Union Message</i>	171
THE MONTH IN REVIEW	181
MAPS • <i>Population Pressure in Africa</i>	139
• <i>The Nations of Africa</i>	Inside Back Cover

Current History

FOUNDED IN 1914

MARCH, 1971
VOLUME 60 NUMBER 355

Editor:

CAROL L. THOMPSON

Assistant Editors:

MARY M. ANDERBERG

JOAN B. ANTELL

Editorial Assistant:

JEAN HANSEN

Contributing Editors:

ROSS N. BERKES

University of Southern California

RICHARD BUTWELL

The National War College

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

Columbia University, Emeritus

HANS W. GATZKE

Yale University

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

Wellesley College

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

University of Virginia

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

University of Notre Dame

HANS KOHN

City University of New York, Emeritus

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania

CARROLL QUIGLEY

Georgetown University

JOHN P. ROCHE

Brandeis University

A. L. ROWSE

All Souls College, Oxford

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania

HARRY R. RUDIN

Yale University

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Portland State College

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE

University of the Pacific

COLSTON E. WARNE

Amherst College

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

University of Pennsylvania, Emeritus

President and Publisher:

DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Vice President:

ELBERT P. THOMPSON

\$1.00 a copy • \$9.50 a year • Canada \$10.00 a year • Foreign \$10.50 a year

Please see back cover for quantity purchase rates.

NO ADVERTISING

Coming Next Month

JAPAN, 1971

Is Japan the coming superpower? In our April, 1971, issue, seven articles evaluate Japan's position in the 1970's and analyze her strengths and weaknesses as she takes her place among the world powers. Articles include:

Japan's Role as a World Power

by MARTIN E. WEINSTEIN, University of Illinois at Urbana

Japan and Non-Communist Asia

by KEI WAKAISUMI, Kyoto Sango University, Kyoto, Japan

Japanese Government and Politics

by GERALD CURTIS, Columbia University

The Japanese Economy

by SOLOMON B. LEVINE, University of Wisconsin

Japanese Trade Patterns

by KOJI TAIRA, University of Illinois at Champagne

Cultural and Intellectual Trends in Japan

by W. SCOTT MORTON, Seton Hall University

Japan's Defense and Security

by MYUNG-KUN YIU, East Texas State University

Published monthly by Current History, Inc., 1822 Ludlow St., Phila., Pa. 19103. Second Class Postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing offices. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, © 1971, by Current History, Inc.

Current History

MARCH, 1971

VOL. 60, NO. 355

How stable are the African states today? What forces for change are at work in the area? In this issue, seven articles explore the situation in the African nations. As our introductory article sees it, "There is no conflict between the redefinition of United States domestic priorities and the direct United States national interest in continuing to contribute to Africa's development needs."

The United States Role in Africa

BY W. A. E. SKURNIK

Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado

OBERVERS FREQUENTLY suggest that the United States has no policy toward Africa.¹ This observation has some validity, in the sense that Africa ranks near the bottom of the government's foreign policy priorities, or in the sense that the suggestion conceals a substantive value judgment. But one need only read the daily press to learn quickly that the United States involvement in Africa is constant and far from invisible. Glancing at random at May, 1970, as a representative month, one is struck by the nearly breathless succession of samples of such involvement: the Justice Department overrules the State Department and denies an entry visa to Mrs. W. E. B. DuBois; pressure groups ask Gulf Oil to cease its Angolan operation; a Peace Corps volunteer is reportedly kidnapped in Ethiopia; over South African protests, the State Department reaffirms its intention to modernize a ferry and

road linking Botswana and Zambia; Nigeria asks for military aid; a Texas oilman is appointed Ambassador to South Africa; the chairman of the House subcommittee on Africa and the owner of the *Philadelphia Tribune* visit the continent; Ambassador Charles W. Yost announces official discouragement of United States investment in Namibia; private citizens contemplate opening a "consulate" in Rhodesia; American contractors reveal the impending completion of an all-weather road from Tanzania to the Zambian border. Beyond such vignettes, the present administration has responded to current problems, defined its general position on African problems, tended to follow some guidelines from the Lyndon Johnson era, and taken a number of fresh initiatives best symbolized by the first visit to Africa of an American Secretary of State.²

Before looking at actual United States policy, it is instructive to review briefly some constraints facing the Africa Bureau of the State Department. Many of these constraints limit policy and originate in the policy process as well as the world context. For-

¹ The term "Africa" in this article refers to "sub-Saharan Africa."

² Key materials defining American policy include the President's "state of the world" message and *U.S. and Africa in the 70's*. Quotations are from public congressional hearings.

ign policy is no longer a stylized ballet for elitist diplomats, and its substance cannot be neatly categorized as "foreign" to the social fabric of a nation. Relations among states are becoming more, not less, interpenetrated.

Textbooks may tell us that the State Department does not make policy, that it merely implements it. But this is too simple. Implementation involves scores of other government agencies and private groups, ranging from the few citizens burning to open a consulate in Rhodesia after the government has just closed it, through coordination problems in the field, to the many cross pressures in Washington. The United States abstention from United Nations votes condemning Portugal for armed incursions into African states does not necessarily represent the views of the State Department's Africa Bureau. The Justice Department's effort to prevent Mrs. DuBois' visit was grounded in an anachronistic piece of cold war legislation suggesting that Americans are fearful of contamination from "foreign" ideologies.

CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE

Perhaps more significant, policy suffers from the executive-legislative malaise which dominates many headlines. Part of the problem is congressional resentment of the decline of legislatures, a global phenomenon seemingly discovered only recently by some Congressmen after substantive policy differences with administrations. Some Senators contend that Congress is the primary, rather than a coordinate, branch of the United States government. Senator J. William Fulbright has suggested that the clock be turned back to an era of greater congressional prominence in foreign affairs; during 1970 hearings on Ethiopia, for instance, he declared that "being strict constructionists, we are trying to hold this administration to the Constitution. . . ." Underlying this kind of debate there is an uncomfortable question: what effect do public revelations have on the future credibility of secret agreements between the United States executive and foreign countries, and on opportunities for competing powers to use rules of the international game having no re-

lation to issues like American democracy? Whereas few United States legislators are interested in Africa, there are some Congressmen, like Representative Charles C. Diggs (D., Mich.), who perform valuable service by raising issues and initiating debate.

There are few American pressure groups concerned with Africa, and those most vocal and effective support southern Africa, which they view as a bastion against world communism. Black Americans are far from united about a desirable posture toward Africa; for understandable reasons, they have other priorities. Moreover, for them to align themselves behind a particular policy stance may well be counterproductive: it may inject racial considerations into the debate and elicit an unfavorable view of United States relations with Africa. A sizable body of scholars concerned with the United States and Africa has not yet emerged. This being said, the symbolic and inspirational value of sensitive black Americans' statements should not be airily brushed aside. A recent statement by United States tennis champion Arthur Ashe, for instance, deserves rescue from the relative obscurity of congressional hearings. Asked what the United States should do in light of the deplorable South African refusal to allow blacks to compete against whites, he said:

. . . my emotional answer to that, being a black American, is that our State Department should not allow South African athletes in . . . as long as their government continues its present policy of excluding black American athletes. However, after further reflection, my normal conscience tells me that the US should not stoop to the low level of the South Africans' stated policy of racial discrimination because in effect I would condone the premise that two wrongs make a right.

United States policy is affected also by developments elsewhere. President Richard Nixon's February, 1970, "state of the world" message pledged support for Africans' dignity, equality, and quest for development along lines of their own choosing. Yet to many Africans President Nixon appeared rude when, in October, 1970, he said that the future of the world depends largely upon United States-Soviet relations; to a United Nations audience of developing states, he

seemed to be ignoring their legitimate demands; instead, he projected an image of machiavellianism. The difference in the President's perceptions can be explained by extra-African events: turmoil in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Events in these two areas required replacing the early official wide-angled lens with a longer lens; when President Nixon went to the United Nations, his vision was adjusted to major crises, and Africa was out of focus.

Direct United States economic interests in Africa, although growing, are relatively marginal. United States commerce with Africa amounts to only 3.5 per cent of total United States foreign trade, and United States private investments there amount to less than 1 per cent of the world total. United States exports to the continent increased from \$800 million to \$1.4 billion between 1960 and 1969, and imports from Africa nearly doubled during the same period. African markets are increasing in the face of serious obstacles, including shortages of foreign exchange, protectionism, low per capita income, and the unfamiliarity of American businessmen with the area. If Africa's growth continues at presently anticipated rates, her total imports will amount to some \$11 billion by 1974; if United States exports merely maintain their present percentage, they will reach \$1 billion in that year. To a large extent, Africa's economic growth can be attributed to the fact that she is a vast storehouse of natural resources. African minerals which represent a considerable share of world reserves and production include manganese, copper, iron, antimony, chromium, gold, phosphates, petroleum, bauxite and diamonds.

In United States commerce, the relative share of southern Africa is decreasing and that of independent Africa is increasing. (United States trade with Rhodesia is confined to exports of medical and educational supplies, and hence declined from \$37 million in 1965 to \$600,000 in 1969, following United Nations trade sanctions against Rhodesia.) For the present, the Republic of South Africa remains the United States' largest African trading partner: \$500 million in United

States exports and \$250 million in imports for 1969. Trade with Angola and Mozambique increases southern Africa's total to some 40 per cent of United States exports to Africa, and nearly 30 per cent of United States imports. Prospects for greater United States trade appear particularly bright in the Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, the Malagasi Republic, Ghana, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, and Cameroun. Nigeria alone imports \$100 million worth of United States goods, and other states seem anxious to develop trade with the United States.

American private investment on the continent is concentrated in South Africa and Libya, which together make up about half the total; in view of her oil, Libya may soon replace South Africa as the major recipient. Sizable investment in independent black Africa is found chiefly in the more developed countries like Nigeria (\$200 million), Ghana, the Ivory Coast, the Congo (Kinshasa), and Liberia. United States private investment in Africa has been rising at 14 per cent per year and now totals about \$3 billion. Over 60 per cent of this capital is invested in the petroleum industry; the remainder is attracted by mining and smelting and, to a lesser but growing degree, by manufacturing.

A CONCENTRATION POLICY

United States public economic aid to Africa—excluding surplus food and the Peace Corps—peaked at \$315 million in fiscal 1962 and decreased to \$154 million by 1969. The Nixon administration, pledged to arrest the absolute decline, requested \$186 million for fiscal 1970 and \$161 million for the following year. Several important factors characterize United States aid. First, it is intended as a supplement to aid received from other, chiefly European, sources; hence it comes to about 20 per cent of the continent's external public aid. Second, United States aid is highly concentrated. This concentration policy, attributed to 1967 recommendations by Ambassador Edward M. Korry, is no more than an official recognition of an existing pattern. Between 1947 and 1967, 47 per cent of United States aid to Africa went to 7

states.³ After 1967, the United States government singled out 8 "development emphasis" countries as the chief recipients of bilateral assistance: the Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and the East African Community (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania). These 8 states comprise about 66 per cent of Africa's people (Rhodesia and South Africa do not get United States aid) and receive between 50 per cent and 60 per cent of the total allotted to Africa—53.4 per cent in fiscal year 1970. This concentration is justified by a number of overlapping factors: a country's economic potential for approaching "takeoff"; the size of the potential market [Nigeria, the world's ninth largest populous nation, plus the Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia and Tanzania include over 120 million people]; the attraction of most of these countries for private capital; the prospects for regional growth and cooperation; the actual or potential influence of these nations in Africa; and United States security interests, most prominent in Ethiopia.

A few brief comments may be useful. The present administration has reinforced an important trend toward increasing the share of economic aid to regional groupings and multidonor projects. Reflecting growing recognition that narrow economic nationalism may result in waste and duplication, that share rose from 7.7 per cent for the 1960-1968 period to 38.9 per cent for fiscal 1970. In addition, United States aid is being adapted to Africa's most pressing needs; for fiscal 1971, 84.3 per cent of the administration request was earmarked for the following categories: agriculture, 28.5 per cent; education, 13.7 per cent; self-help, 13.4 per cent; transportation, 12.3 per cent; and health and population programs, 6.9 per cent. Finally, United States economic involvement in Africa is not necessarily related to ideological criteria. United States investments, for instance, are as significant in Guinea and Ghana as in Nigeria and the Ivory Coast. United States help for internal security forces

went to Guinea and Mali under Mali's President Modibo Keita as well as to Senegal, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Likewise, the Peace Corps has operated in most African states, subject only to the host country's stated needs.

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS

United States strategic interests in Africa are comparatively negligible. Direct conflict among the "great" powers would be an undesirable drain on United States resources. A strong, nonaligned Africa is probably the best guarantee against big power conflict; thus United States policy-makers have abandoned earlier moralism about neutralism. The United States has neither combat force nor alliance in Africa. Constructive competition in non-strategic areas is no cause for alarm; indeed, it may help develop and strengthen Africa. Of United States strategic interests, the most important are NASA tracking stations for orbital and deep space exploration, electronic monitoring devices, and overflight rights. United States installations like those in the Azores and in Ethiopia derive their importance from extra-African considerations. Given the sophisticated technology of strategic defense, however, it is not clear that these installations are essential, except in the sense that they might become irritants were they available to potential antagonists. But United States policy, on the whole, has yielded to African demands for withdrawal.

The United States military aid program is relatively small. Grant aid for the continent came to \$18.5 million in fiscal 1970 and \$18.6 million for 1971; this represents about 5 per cent of the global United States program. Military grants are also highly concentrated. Of expenditures in fiscal 1969 in Africa, 79.1 per cent went to Ethiopia, 14.6 per cent to the Congo (Kinshasa) and the balance to Liberia, Nigeria and Senegal. Between 1950 and 1969, nearly 4,000 Africans from 11 countries participated in the United States military training program, 95 per cent of whom were trained in the United States; Africans thus made up 1.3 per cent of all

³ The current "development emphasis" countries, minus East Africa, but plus Somalia and the Sudan, received \$956.9 million out of a total of \$2 billion.

foreigners trained. The same pattern of concentration is apparent here. Of the African total, 68.3 per cent were from Ethiopia, 9.6 per cent from Liberia, 8.2 per cent from Nigeria, and 5.8 per cent from the Congo (Kinshasa); thus four countries provided 91.9 per cent of all African military personnel trained by the United States.

Total United States military sales to the continent between 1950 and 1969 came to \$80.6 million, of which 55.8 per cent were for cash. The fiscal year 1970 estimate was for \$16.4 million. Actual deliveries for black Africa amounted to 0.4 per cent of global deliveries for the 1950-1969 period. Deliveries to individual countries [chiefly Ethiopia, the Congo (Kinshasa), Liberia, Nigeria and Ghana] remain relatively small. Finally, civic action programs are administered by AID and are intended to strengthen recipient countries' internal security capabilities. Africa's share of the world total was 2.4 per cent between 1962 and 1966, and was highly concentrated. Senegal received 32.6 per cent, Guinea 28.7 per cent, Liberia 20.6 per cent, Mali 10.8 per cent, and Ethiopia 5.7 per cent of the African total. In the following three years, the number of recipient countries was reduced further; the main recipients were Senegal, Liberia and Ethiopia.

United States policy toward Ethiopia is an exception to this pattern. It stands as an example of tenacious resistance to change, of a military variant of Parkinson's Law. The initial United States commitment, in 1953, assumed that the communication facilities near Asmara were indispensable to the global United States defense network. Subsequent increases in United States aid were a function of ideological cold war mentality. Even so, one gets the impression that the United States overreacted to Ethiopian demands for payment for the Kagnew installation. As a result, Ethiopia's defense posture is far out of proportion to any external or internal security threats, and to her own ability to maintain her present defense establishment. When neighboring Somalia became independent in 1960, Ethiopia wanted to increase her armed forces from 18,000 to 32,000 men to

cope with Somali forces of about 2,000. (Somalia turned to the Soviet Union for military help in 1963, and now has an armed force of 12,000 men.) By 1970, the United States was helping Ethiopia to maintain some 45,000 men in arms. United States aid totaled \$400 million, of which \$250 million was economic. U.S. military aid to Ethiopia comprises between one-half and two-thirds of the military aid for Africa; for fiscal 1970, it was 82.7 per cent of the total for black Africa. In 1960, the United States went on record as opposing "any activities threatening the territorial integrity of Ethiopia." This has been interpreted as a commitment to help secure the country from domestic dissidence; and since Kagnew and its supply port of Massawa are in Eritrea, home of the dissident Eritrean Liberation Front, American personnel may become involved in internal unrest. Given the inherent fragility of Ethiopia's political system and the nationalist ferment which accompanies political change in Africa, the better part of wisdom suggests a lower United States profile in that country. A timetable for replacing the Kagnew facilities before the agreement expires in 1978, coupled with alternate water-based, airborne and space facilities, would relieve irritation, prevent possible loss of prestige, and remove the United States from a sticky nettle. There are signs that the United States, in a low-key response to the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, is searching for alternate means of collecting information. The two functions could be easily merged and, although costlier in terms of dollars, would remove a likely trouble spot from African-American relations.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Several policy guidelines undergird the United States government's response to the situation in southern Africa. First, Africans and Americans share a commitment to self-determination and majority rule. Second, the refractory attitudes and anachronistic behavior of incumbent regimes fly in the face of such commitments. Third, decolonization is, for better or worse, a major and irreversible

phenomenon of the twentieth century. Fourth, some former colonial powers have taken a rational and prudent path toward the peaceful evolution of relations between themselves and Africa. Fifth, violence is too costly in human sacrifice when pitted against crushing military and paramilitary force and an apparently indomitable will to resist violent change. And sixth, nonviolent means hold the greatest promise for evolution toward majority rule.

United States policy is determined also by a number of more immediate considerations with regard to the results of various policy alternatives. The first concerns the ability—as distinct from the willingness—of independent Africa to affect the situation significantly. Either individually or collectively, independent Africa lacks the capability to pressure the dominant regimes of southern Africa to alter their goals and policies. One important factor in guiding United States policy is the perceptions of African states geographically closest to southern Africa. Their views were expressed when 14 central and eastern African leaders convened in Zambia in 1969 and issued the "Lusaka Manifesto." Two points stand out in that historic document. One is that the opposition of these states to present conditions rests on their abhorrence of *official* policies which deny the ideal of equality and of government by consent of the governed within existing political boundaries. Attempts to change borders, through Bantustans or other devices, are unacceptable because they tend to perpetuate disparities. The second major point was the willingness of these states to accept evolution, rather than armed revolt, as a solution. This was an open invitation to the dominant regimes to begin by recognizing the legitimacy of equality for the majorities whom they now control.

A second practical question concerns "disengagement." The advocates of this policy believe that diplomatic and economic isolation would force the incumbent dominant groups in southern Africa to come to terms with majority rights. It is probable, however, that such a policy would only stiffen

their necks, aside from the formidable question of establishing an effective international boycott. Disengagement from Rhodesia was less effective than anticipated. Disengagement from Portugal would hardly affect that country's ability and will to sustain a major "defense" burden. Unless disengagement is global, it remains symbolic; and symbolic gestures are inherently unsatisfactory because they are insufficient.

At the same time, inaction runs great risks. It could alienate the rest of Africa and the Third World, encourage present leaders to persist in their policies, help portray the United States as a stronghold of insensitive reaction, allow initiatives to pass to competing powers and, possibly, encourage violence. The moral challenge posed by southern Africa is among the most poignant in recent history. The psychological, cultural and material damage being inflicted on great numbers of human beings is incalculable, and it is all the more unfortunate because of its racial undertones. It is a constant torment to humanist consciences, whose dedication to individual freedom, respect and collective self-determination is being trampled underfoot, and who remain frustrated at their inability to effect change.

A third question concerns active support for freedom fighters. It would be surprising if any United States government, conscious of widespread popular revulsion against moral crusades abroad, eagerly embarked upon another such venture. A clear and popularly sustained American commitment to eradicate injustice in southern Africa does not exist today, and signs do not point to its imminent creation. A fourth, crucial factor relates to the ability and demonstrated willingness of southern Africa's majorities to become conscious of their plight and act accordingly. The debate about whether mounting frustrations which can eventually be channeled into meaningful political demands must come as a result of more deprivation or greater liberalization is somewhat off the mark. Rising expectations are relative, not absolute; they can occur in the midst of plenty as well as poverty. The key seems to be perception,

not actual condition. Assuming that the consciousness of African majorities has not yet been aroused to the point where they are willing to undergo the many sacrifices of sustained and concerted political action, success must await further developments inside these countries. There is something patronizing in the suggestion that deprived majorities can enjoy their birthrights only with outside aid.

If it is accepted that interests and commitments regarding an evolution toward representative government leading to eventual majority rule in southern Africa are shared by independent African states, nationalist organizations and the United States government, then the question becomes one of defining the most effective way to achieve these objectives. For the United States, policy alternatives run the gamut from verbal condemnation, through selective diplomatic, economic and military measures, to actual military involvement. The United States could (1) do nothing, (2) condemn the regimes' racial policies, (3) apply direct and indirect pressures, (4) overtly help freedom fighters with training and weapons, (5) blockade the area, or (6) intervene directly with force. The first, fifth and sixth options are unrealistic because of the nature of United States values and commitments and the need for nonexistent international cooperation. The fourth option conflicts with the United States commitment to a peaceful solution as well as with the capabilities and interests of most African states—their official rhetoric notwithstanding. United States policy, therefore, follows the second and third alternatives, which are close to recommendations by the United Nations and the majority of African states. The Nixon administration has continued earlier pressures—including bans on trade with Rhodesia and on arms sales to South Africa, recognition of United Nations responsibility for Namibia, and assurances that Portugal will not use NATO weapons supplied directly by the United States. Moreover, the United States government has reiterated its abhorrence of racially inspired policies, has closed the United States consulate in Rhodesia, has given support to states

close to southern Africa, and has discouraged British intentions to sell arms to South Africa.

Present United States policy toward southern Africa assumes short-term stability and highly probable long-range instability. There are forces at work which in the long run will inevitably alter the perceptions of the dominant regimes regarding their own future. A case can, in fact, be made to support this line of thinking. Inside Portugal, recent proposed constitutional changes foreshadow more autonomy for the African territories, and it is likely that the dichotomy between intransigent continued domination over distant parts of another continent and a European orientation à l'espagnole will have to be faced by sensitive leadership groups. Turning toward Europe is not inconsistent with the gradual devolution of political authority to Africans or with continued economic cooperation; the models are there. Rhodesia's present leaders cannot but be acutely aware of the United Nations initiated economic boycott.

As for the Republic of South Africa, the continuing modernization and expansion of its economy requires even that apparently uncompromising country to ignore the many transgressions of apartheid legislation by business firms. Moreover, serious questions are being raised about the costs of implementing apartheid to its logical conclusions; younger Afrikaaners, lacking their elders' missionary zeal and trained in modern professional skills, have some doubts about the wisdom of the present course of their government. There are also signs that blacks are attracted by variants of *négritude*, are look-

(Continued on page 176)

Before joining the faculty at the University of Colorado, **Walter Skurnik** was an assistant professor of political science at Pennsylvania Military College from 1963 to 1965. He is a frequent contributor to journals on African affairs and is the author of "The Military in Dahomey," in Claude E. Welch (ed.), *Soldier and State in Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

"With declining mortality and constant fertility, the population of tropical Africa will increase rapidly in the years ahead. This increase will intensify the already very serious problem of population pressure, while enormously complicating the overall process of economic development." If the population growth rate increases, "it is problematic whether a stable political order could be maintained."

Population Pressure in Tropical Africa

By THOMAS E. DOW, JR.
Staff Associate, The Population Council

PART OF THE CONVENTIONAL wisdom surrounding tropical Africa is that, in general, it does not have a population problem. This old myth is now faced with new realities which suggest that population pressure in Africa is already an extensive and serious problem—one, incidentally, that is likely to get considerably worse.

As of mid-1969, the population of tropical Africa was approximately 262 million, and the average density per square mile was about 30 persons. The total land area of tropical Africa represents about 16 per cent of the earth's surface, and contains about 7 per cent of the world's population.

Of course these figures tell nothing about either population growth or the actual distribution of people. The former requires that we determine the level and balance of fertility and mortality;¹ the latter, that we identify the density levels actually being experienced by different segments of the population.

FERTILITY

Independent estimates of tropical African fertility by the Princeton Office of Population Research and the United Nations suggest that the crude birth rate is almost certainly

¹ Migration is a third determinant of population growth; but for tropical Africa as a whole, it is not likely to be a major factor of net gain or loss.

in the range of 45–50 per 1,000 population, and that the total fertility rate, or the average number of births per woman, is in excess of 6 children. With the exception of certain areas in Latin America, this is the highest level of regional fertility in the world. Yet not all areas of tropical Africa or all groups within the African population are part of this high fertility pattern.

Zones of low fertility have long been recognized in all major regions of tropical Africa. In general, low fertility in these areas is not due to deliberate family planning, modern contraception or economic development. Instead, it is probably attributable to traditional cultural and biological factors; and, in particular, to the greater incidence of venereal disease in the low fertility regions.

This conclusion is supported inferentially by data from the Congo, which indicate a high correlation between average area birth rates and rates of childlessness; i.e., high-fertility districts are mostly those where the rate of childlessness is low while low-fertility districts are generally those where it is high. The disproportionate presence of childless women in certain districts—given the desire of virtually all African women for some offspring—must indicate a physical inability rather than a personal unwillingness to have children, the specific origin of this sterility apparently being, once again, the high in-

cidence of venereal disease in these areas of Africa.²

In addition to these broad variations, there are also fertility differentials which distinguish individuals and groups within the larger regional population. In particular, fertility differentials between urban and rural populations, and between different social class and educational groups within these populations, would seem to be the most significant.

Thus one can say that regional fertility variations generally reflect traditional cultural, medical and biological conditions, while variations within populations reflect the differential impact of modernization. This distinction is significant for the present and prospective course of tropical African fertility.

One can effectively illustrate and assess the broad impact of modernization on fertility by means of a case study. Using Ghana as an example of a more developed tropical African state, one can easily document fertility differentials along residential, socio-economic and educational lines, with urban, educated and higher-status women having substantially lower fertility than their rural, uneducated and lower-status counterparts. Perhaps the most striking example of this association is the fact that the completed fertility of Ghanaian women with elementary, secondary and higher education is 6 per cent, 66 per cent, and 94 per cent lower, respectively, than that of women with no education.³

While these associations are relatively clear, their impact on national fertility is less certain. S. K. Gaisie, for example, concludes his own analysis of national fertility trends with the observation that there seems to be no strong evidence of either rising or falling

trends in fertility. On the contrary, if the movements suggest anything, they point towards an increase in the course of time.⁴

On balance, there is no indication that modernization, as reflected in the lower fertility of small social and economic groups, has had any appreciable effect on the overall level of Ghanaian fertility. This is not to deny that the impact will increase with the gradual growth of these "low" fertility groups, but only to note that this process will not be reflected in national trends for some time to come. (In countries less developed than Ghana, the process will obviously take much longer.) Meanwhile, the early spread of modernization may have the paradoxical result of increasing, not decreasing, the fertility of the overall population.

In situations where low fertility may be attributed primarily to traditional cultural, medical and biological factors, modernization will often tend to reduce or eliminate these physiological or cultural restrictions without immediately or even necessarily altering people's attitudes toward family size. Under these circumstances, regional differences in fertility which are not the result of deliberate birth control should decline with social, economic and medical improvements. In practice, this means that fertility in lower regions will rise to the higher levels prevailing in the remainder of the country.

In general, it appears likely that the circumstances in which people live will change more rapidly than their attitudes and actions with regard to family size and family planning; and that, on balance, more births will be facilitated than averted in tropical Africa during the early stages of modernization. For the foreseeable future, this suggests at least a continuation if not an increase in the current level of fertility.

MORTALITY

In the absence of vital registration, mortality estimates must be derived from census and survey data. This requires that the living be able to recall the age, sex, and number of persons dying in a given period. Assuming that such events are fully and ac-

² See Anatole Romaniuk, "Infertility in Tropical Africa," in J. C. Caldwell and C. Okonjo (eds.), *The Population of Tropical Africa* (London: Longmans, 1968), pp. 214-224; and Thomas E. Dow, Jr., "Fertility and Family Planning in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (October, 1970), pp. 446-447.

³ See John C. Caldwell, "Some Factors Affecting Fertility in Ghana," paper presented at the I.U.S.S.P. meeting, London, 1969, p. 2.

⁴ S. K. Gaisie, "Estimated Mid-Twentieth Century Levels and Trends of Fertility in Ghana," paper presented at the I.U.S.S.P. meeting, London, 1969, p. 9.

curately recalled—which is usually not the case—the resulting estimates are still limited to a specific point in time. Under changing mortality conditions, this is a very serious limitation. Nevertheless, such estimates can suggest at least the general level of mortality.

If we exclude island populations, the crude death rate ranges from approximately 18–20 per 1,000 in Kenya, Uganda and Zambia to 35–40 per 1,000 in Upper Volta and Guinea. For the region as a whole, the United Nations suggests a death rate of approximately 21 per 1,000.

In evaluating this mortality level, one should note the following points: first, it represents the highest level of regional or continental mortality in the world; second, although this level is very high, it is certainly substantially lower than it was several generations ago; and third, there is every indication of another major decline, which should reduce the present level of mortality by 40–50 per cent before the end of the century.

Up to the present, the decline in tropical African mortality can be attributed primarily to broad public health programs which have controlled or reduced major infectious diseases such as small pox, measles and malaria. Significantly, this was accomplished without a major transformation in the traditional social and economic life of the people. Thus, even in the absence of substantial modernization, the application of Western techniques of disease control (e.g., insect eradication and mass immunization) has resulted in a dramatic reduction in mortality. In spite of this reduction, however, tropical Africa still has the world's highest level of mortality. It remains to inquire how this pattern may be altered in the future; that is, how fast and how far will the death rate fall in the years ahead?

It can be argued that in the future declines in mortality will depend more on the general level and rate of social and economic development than they did in the past. If this is so, rapid reductions in mortality will be harder

to achieve in the years ahead. Still, closer examination of present levels of development and patterns of mortality suggests that prospects for a further reduction in the death rate in the near future are reasonably good.


Relative to the West, tropical African states have a disproportionate number of deaths in infancy and childhood. Moreover, within these categories there are more deaths in the age group 1–4 than in the age group 0–1; and, similarly, more deaths in the age group 1–12 months than in the age group 0–1 month. This distribution suggests that most infant and child deaths may be attributed to environmental rather than hereditary or birth-related factors; that is, to factors that can be ameliorated by social, economic and medical development.

Finally, it appears that only a moderate level of development, such as that found in Hungary, for example, is necessary greatly to reduce environmentally related infant and child deaths. Accordingly, any moderate improvement in the standard of living in the more advanced developing nations of tropical Africa would greatly reduce the total number of annual deaths and, as a consequence, would sharply lower the crude death rate.⁵

In general, an overall pattern of mortality decline must be anticipated throughout tropical Africa, although the specific rate of decline will vary greatly from country to country and region to region. On the assumption that the net effect of these different patterns is reasonably reflected in the United Nations' medium estimate, we can anticipate a decline in the crude death rate from 21–23 per 1,000 in 1969 to 13 per 1,000 by the end of the century. Without a corresponding reduction in fertility, such a decline will bring about a major increase in the population growth rate of the region.

Under conditions of high fertility and declining mortality, the annual population growth rate in tropical Africa has increased from perhaps 1 per cent in 1930 to approximately 2.5 per cent in 1970. Should this trend continue, that is, should the death rate continue to fall without a corresponding reduction in the birth rate, the annual rate of

⁵ See K. Miltenyi, "Mortality Patterns in Ghana," paper presented at the I.U.S.S.P. meeting, London, 1969, p. 4.



Source: William Hance, *The Demography of Tropical Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.

FIGURE I: POPULATION PRESSURE IN AFRICA

population increase would exceed 3 per cent before the end of the century. Such an increase would only further complicate the already serious problem of population pressure in tropical Africa.

POPULATION PRESSURE

The widely held myth that tropical Africa does not have a population problem derives primarily from a superficial analysis of population distribution. Accordingly, stress is placed on the fact that Africa's average density of 29.5 persons per square mile (mid-1969) is lower than that of any other continent except Australia, and this "evidence" is advanced to "prove" that under- rather than over-population is the more normal condition in most of tropical Africa.⁶

While crude density figures are intrinsically accurate, they tend to obscure the true situation. If we consider people rather than land, we find that approximately 84 per cent, 73 per cent, 72 per cent, and 87 per cent of the population in west, middle, east and south Africa, respectively, live at a density higher than the regional average. This implies a situation of land use in which few people inhabit relatively large areas at low density; while many people occupy relatively small areas at medium to high density.

This pattern is illustrated in west Africa—with an average density of 44 people per square mile—where roughly 3 per cent of the population occupies 53 per cent of the area at a density of less than 10 per square mile; while 64 per cent of the population occupies 11 per cent of the area at a density of more than 100 per square mile.

In short, the division of large areas by small populations produces low crude density figures, but it does not make it clear that most of the population concerned is actually experiencing moderate to high density. Naturally, the population may also be experiencing

⁶ Perhaps the best and most current analysis of population pressure in Africa is offered by William Hance, *Population Migration, and Urbanization in Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 383-431. I have accepted his general conclusions in the following discussion.

⁷ Hance, *op. cit.*, pp. 417-418.

⁸ Hance, *op. cit.*, p. 422.

population pressure, but the two are not identical; that is, population pressure is not necessarily inevitable under conditions of high density, nor is it necessarily precluded in situations of low density. The relationship between the two must be determined empirically in each area.

To this end, William Hance suggests certain factors that are usually indicative of excess population in a given region:⁷

1. Soil deterioration, degradation or outright destruction.
2. Use of excessively steep slopes and other marginal lands.
3. Declining crop yields.
4. Changing crop emphases, especially to soil-tolerant crops such as manioc.
5. Reduction in the fallow period and lengthening of the cropping period without measures to retain soil fertility.
6. Breakdown of the indigenous farming system.
7. Food shortages, hunger, and malnutrition.
8. Land fragmentation, disputes over land, landlessness.
9. Rural indebtedness.
10. Unemployment and underemployment in rural and/or urban areas.
11. Certain types of out-migration.

Applying these standards throughout tropical Africa, Hance reports that 37.2 per cent of the area and 40.2 per cent of the population were experiencing population pressure in mid-1967. As Figure 1 indicates, pressure existed in areas of low and moderate as well as high density. Still, these pressures could be reduced "by extension of agriculture to lands not now being used, by intensifying and rationalizing agriculture on present areas, and by absorbing adequate numbers of people in non-agricultural activities."⁸

Unfortunately, as Hance indicates, each of these theoretical possibilities has distinct practical limitations: first, the rate of urbanization, although relatively rapid, will not be adequate to absorb surplus rural population; second, the possibility of extending the agricultural area will be limited severely by the availability of good soils; and third, the local economy will not be able to provide the costly inputs which are required for the modification and intensification of agriculture.

These limitations indicate that there will

be no easy or immediate solution to the problem of population pressure in tropical Africa. Moreover, even the eventual improvements implicit in the long-term process of modernization may be rendered problematic by present and prospective levels of population growth.

POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

It is now generally acknowledged that rapid population growth ordinarily tends to limit the rate of social and economic development, in that it forces the nation to spend a disproportionate amount of its wealth providing for population increases with the result that little capital is left for "progressive" investment.⁹ To take a simple illustration, if a nation is increasing its product by 4 per cent a year, and if its population is growing at 3 per cent a year, this will leave only 1 per cent for the improvement of the standard of living, the remaining surplus being consumed by the demands of the increased population. Under these circumstances, it would take 70 years to double per capita income. On the other hand, a lower rate of population growth would alter the age structure in such a way as to permit higher levels of savings, investment and economic growth. With fewer dependent children, and proportionately more workers, there would be a rapid increase in national product and a greater share of wealth for each individual. In this sense, "low" fertility encourages a steep rise in per capita income.

All these principles would seem to pertain in the case of tropical Africa, where rapid population growth—of perhaps 2.5 per cent per year—threatens to cancel the strenuous efforts now being made to improve the individual standard of living. Like Asia and Latin America before it, Africa is now confronting "the barriers to social and economic progress that come with extremely rapid population increase."¹⁰ Under these circumstances, it is useful to consider what the

prospects are for a significant reduction in tropical Africa's rate of population growth.

FAMILY PLANNING

All available evidence suggests that traditional anti-natal practices—e.g., post-partum continence, incomplete coitus, primitive mechanical or herbal abortion—are widely known in tropical Africa, and could have produced a substantial decline in fertility had they been used generally and systematically.

In practice, however, some traditional methods, such as abortion, are not considered appropriate within stable marriages, but are resorted to only in cases where marriage would be unsuitable or impossible; that is, in situations where the birth of a child would not be socially approved. Under traditional conditions, such situations would probably be relatively infrequent.

On the other hand, the practice of continence and incomplete coitus by married couples during lactation is a more common pattern. If properly applied, this approach obviously decreases the number of conceptions, but it also tends to improve the chances that the remaining conceptions will be successful. It is therefore essentially not a method of contraception, but rather a technique for maximizing the number of surviving children. Consequently, its impact on the overall level of fertility is limited.

Overall, the deliberate attempt to reduce marital fertility by whatever means has not been common in tropical Africa, but there are some indications that this pattern may be changing.

Recent surveys suggest that substantial numbers of African women approve of and are interested in learning more about family

(Continued on page 177)

Thomas E. Dow, Jr., has just returned from Sierra Leone where he served as Resident Advisor in Sociology and Demography from 1968 to 1970. He is presently a Staff Associate with the Population Council in New York. The present article is his fourth contribution to *Current History* on the subject of population.

⁹ Dow, *op. cit.*, pp. 451-454.

¹⁰ William Brass et al., *The Demography of Tropical Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 167.

"A balanced assessment . . . would conclude that France's economic support constitutes a major element in the calculus of nation-building in Africa."

Francophone Africa

BY WILLIAM H. LEWIS
African Affairs Specialist

MORE THAN A DECADE has passed since the first of France's African dependencies began to slip away from colonial rule. Morocco and Tunisia became independent in 1956; then Guinea in 1958; and the remainder at full tide beginning in 1960. The manner in which the course to independence was negotiated by these new states varied widely—with Algeria's experience clearly the most bloody and traumatic. Yet their residual ties with France have remained uncommonly similar.

Indeed, the bonds that link most of the former dependencies to Paris are probably stronger and more durable today than they were in the mid-1950's. The reasons for this are not difficult to see. With the severing of the colonial umbilical cord, many of the psychological and political liabilities of the past were put aside. The development of new communities of interest could proceed without the inhibitions of the cynical myths and emotional disabilities of a bygone era. Moreover, the leaders of the francophonic states could accept the principle of interdependence without any sense of impairment to national sovereignty. Other options have remained open to them, including membership in regional and ethnic associations such as the Organization of Africa Unity (O.A.U.), the Arab League, and OCAM (the Common Organization of African and Malagasy States).

Despite these options, throughout the past decade, the ties between the francophonic

states and the former Metropole have overshadowed all others. Embraced in this relationship are common technical assistance and economic development concerns, bisecting trade and financial interests, mutual security needs, shared cultural and educational goals, and a growing sense of community in a world fragmented by political turmoil and rapid social change. That this relationship transcends such misguided characterizations as "neo-colonialist" or "post-imperial hegemony" is borne out by the recent history of Africa.

France's security ties with francophone states below the Sahara remain substantial. France is committed, upon request, to provide 14 African nations with direct military assistance in the event of external aggression; she has also agreed to aid a lesser number should domestic strife threaten the survival of local regimes—however, in such circumstances, she retains a wide area of latitude as to her proper role. Finally, the French government remains the principal supplier of military equipment and training for France's former dependencies. Taken together with the *Union Africaine et Malagach* Defense Agreement of September, 1961, such a tightly knit network of arrangements exists that France's relationship with much of francophone Africa has assumed both the appearance and the substance of a special alliance system.

Under the stewardship of President Charles de Gaulle, the French government tended to

be overprotective in its approach to African internal security problems. During the first half of the 1960's, France consistently honored her obligations to African regimes. For example, French forces were deployed to Cameroun in 1960 and once again in 1961; to Congo (Brazzaville) in 1960 and 1962; to Gabon in 1962; to Chad in 1960 and in 1962-63; and to Mauritania in 1961.

In time, however, Paris began to ponder the proper balance between overinvolvement or compulsive intervention, and abdication of responsibility. To some extent, the de Gaulle government could not be faulted for close identification with the first generation of African leaders. Despite the diversity of their backgrounds, Abbe Fulbert Youlou, Leopold Senghor, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Modibo Keita, and Leon Mba were attractive personalities who shared with France common values and beliefs.

However, every age must fashion its own scale of power. To risk France's resources and reputation at every turn to repel local insurgencies and to cope with civil unrest threatened to become counterproductive. Local African problems had to be dealt with in terms of the capacities or incapacities of African governments. If the latter were incapable of meeting the responsibilities and imperatives of the day, France could not hope to reverse the tide for long with her own resources. In operational terms, this meant that France would have to relate the expenditure of her security resources to purposes that were likely to prove constructive over the long term. Instead of diffusing military power, France sought increasingly to employ it prudently and with clear definition of the limits of French goals.

That the lesson has been absorbed is reflected in the rollcall of African leaders who have been toppled from power by "extra-legal" means. A succession of chieftains, beginning with President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo (who was assassinated in 1963) and including Hubert Maga of Dahomey, Modibo Keita of Mali and President Mba of Gabon, have passed from center stage. Only a handful of leaders have remained in office over the

decade that has passed. At the same time, France has severely reduced the number of her forces stationed below the Sahara—from 16,000 early in 1966 to less than 5,000 today. Her grant military aid programs, on the other hand, have grown from a low of approximately \$25 million in 1960 to in excess of \$40 million in 1970. The transfer of responsibility for internal security has become a seeming fixture in French policy.

THE CHADIAN EXCEPTION

Chad has proved a notable exception to the rule. Traditional ethnic animosities in this Central African state have threatened to bring an abrupt end to any semblance of order. Compounding the difficulties of the government headed by President François Tombalbaye are the limited human and economic resources available to cope with the myriad problems of nation-building, the embryonic condition of Chadian security forces, and the administrative malpractices that are endemic to rudimentary governmental services.

All these factors have combined to spark insurgent movements in the northern districts, which are populated by Sudanic peoples who resent the domination of Fulani "overlords" from the south and their representatives from the ruling *Parti Progressiste tchadien*. The major instrument for insurrection has been the Algiers-based *Front de Liberation Nationale du Chad*. Utilizing the animosity of the Muslim northerners to advantage, *Frolinat* has led a number of attacks upon isolated government outposts in recent years which have alarmed the Tombalbaye government based at Fort Lamy.

In desperation, President Tombalbaye requested the intervention of French forces in 1968. More than 2,000 French troops have been supplied together with airlift and other support elements. After more than two years, armed dissidence has been contained; but, given the many infirmities of the Chadian state, sporadic outbreaks of violence are in prospect. France, as a result, will in due course have to calculate both the costs and the risks involved in her efforts to shore up

a narrowly based southern ruling oligarchy. At present, Paris' options appear limited—ongoing assistance or a winding down of support which, in turn, could lead to spreading anarchy in Central Africa.

DIVERSITY AND DISCORD

Francesco Guicciardini, the noted scholar and theoretician, long ago offered the following precept on the conduct of policy:

Take heed how you involve yourself in new enterprises or engagements; for once in, you are forced to go on. Whence it results that men are often found laboring through tasks which being embarked in they cannot withdraw from. . . . This rule holds most of all in feuds, factions, and wars, before taking part in which, or anything of a like nature, no amount of careful and cautious consideration will be excessive.

The relevance of this admonition to France has been underscored by the frequent collisions that have taken place among the francophone states, as well as the domestic upsets that have intermittently led to dramatic changes in government. Over the past decade, we have witnessed: (1) a rash of disputes over boundaries, principally in the Saharan zone, which led to diplomatic ruptures on at least four occasions; (2) armed conflict between Morocco and Algeria, and Morocco and Spain, as a result of these disputes; (3) frequent accusations of intervention in the affairs of adjacent states—most notably by Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, and Congo (Brazzaville); and (4) support for filibustering expeditions against meddlesome neighbors.

Paradoxically, these disputes have been accompanied by ritualized efforts to create broad regional associations in which diverse interests can be accommodated. Beginning with the ephemeral constellations of 1960-1961—the Monrovia Group and the Casablanca "club"—they have evolved into more concrete aggregations. Starting with the Organization of African Unity (a loose consultative and policy coordination body) formed in 1963, a congeries of organizations have emerged including OCAM, the *Union Douaniers et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale*, the *Union des Etats de l'Afrique Cen-*

trale, the West African *Entente*, and the *Organisation des Etats Riverains du Senegal*. The latter, formed in March, 1968, embraces Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal. It is intended to "promote and intensify cooperation and economic exchanges."

The O.E.R.S. was founded amidst a general euphoria. President Leopold Senghor of Senegal called the agreement a landmark—"the first time that [African] states are creating a confederation." All its founders expressed the hope that O.E.R.S. would be a stepping stone toward political as well as economic union. However, contradiction has jostled hope; even at this writing, the founders have not been able to secure agreement on a common currency; nor has President Sékou Touré of Guinea proved willing to accept "francophonie" as a basic tenet of the O.E.R.S.

Moreover, ideological differences and personal animosities continue to inhibit effective cooperation among African leaders. Thus, the November, 1970, proposal for accommodation with South Africa put forward by the Ivory Coast's President Houphouet-Boigny was greeted with marked coolness in Guinea, Mali and the Congo (Brazzaville). Nor did any of the former French territories react with tangible support for Congo (Brazzaville) in March, 1970, when President Marien Ngouabi crushed a coup attempt purportedly launched with the "active support" of the Mobutu regime (Congo [Kinshasa]). Ngouabi's endorsement of Marxist principles and his close ties with Communist China had estranged his fellow francophonic African leaders, some of whom may have felt no reservation at the prospect of a return of Youlou backers to power.

There are varying views of what an African leader is or should be. Gleaned from the writings of African chiefs-of-state, the following characteristics are salient: he must be first and foremost a wielder of power, but he should be able to serve as conciliator, innovator, persuader, educator and consensus-seeker. In short, emphasis is placed upon his role as political broker.

This requirement is at variance with a re-

quirement for leadership which involves political mobilization. African societies are too segmented and political loyalties are too parochial to provide full play for the skills and stratagems of political mobilizers. Indeed, because of these factors, attempts to create mobilization systems inevitably lead to political tension. Much of the recent history of independent Africa attests to the weaknesses of mobilization regimes.

The seizure of power by military juntas has occurred after mobilization regimes have been discredited or when the excesses of leaders (including their recourse to coercive instruments) have weakened their claims to legitimacy. Disappointment with such excesses led one military chieftain to observe:

The trouble with our country . . . is separatism and regionalism with all their threats of division. The political leaders are not bad; they are men with great qualities who have rendered considerable service to their country, but they have proved that they cannot rise above their personal quarrels. . . . Our objective is to introduce into this country a new style of politics in which the people will rally around a program and not around personalities.¹

The "new style of politics" was recommended for the Republic of Dahomey, and its proposed designer was Colonel Christophe Soglo. Soglo's efforts, launched in the mid-1960's, proved no more successful than those of his civilian counterparts, and he too was subsequently swept aside. Finally, on December 10, 1969, Dahomey experienced its sixth military *putsch* when the army, under Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Kouandete, Chief of Staff, seized power in the wake of an assassination attempt against President Emile-Derlin Zinsow.

A Pennsylvania-sized nation in West Africa, Dahomey has come to represent the quintessence of civilian-military rivalry. Since her independence in 1960, Dahomey has produced three republics, 13 governments, and interminable quarrelling among claimants to power. The divisions are so profound within the educated elite that, over time, they have been transferred to the small

1,500-man army. At one point in 1968-1969, her two "strong men"—Lieutenant Colonels Alphonse Alley and Kouandete—were on the verge of imprisoning one another. Alley was actually jailed for 10 years in October, 1969, for plotting to kidnap Kouandete.

Dahomey returned to civilian rule in May, 1970, when three former presidents of the Republic agreed to establish a ruling triumvirate in the form of a Presidential Council. President Hubert Maga, who held office from 1960-1963, is now serving as head of state and will be succeeded after two years by one of the other members of the Council—former Presidents Sourou Migan Apithy and Justin Tometin Ahomadegbe. In the interim, Colonel Kouandete, the inspirer of the December, 1969, coup, was imprisoned for an abbreviated period; then he was freed and is now serving as deputy to Colonel Alphonse Alley, Dahomey's current Secretary General for Defense.

However, this revolving door approach to political power has not become a generalized pattern elsewhere in francophone Africa. The military leaders of Mali, who assumed governing authority in 1968, have performed admirably in bringing a divided country to a new threshold of unity. Mali's Military Committee of National Liberation has formulated a well grounded economic development program, shored up Mali's relations with France, and injected a measure of realism and responsibility in government administration that is reassuring to everyone.

Similarly, in Upper Volta, the army has proceeded cautiously but constructively in its efforts to create a viable form of government. Political parties were permitted to compete

(Continued on page 177)

William H. Lewis has taught at George Washington University and the University of Michigan and writes frequently for professional journals. He is editor and co-author of *New Forces in Africa* (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964), and *French-Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity* (New York: Walker & Co., 1965).

¹ Quoted in *Africa Report*, February, 1966, p. 15.

Despite the possibility of short-run change, this author believes that "Over the longer term . . . without substantial Great Power intervention, it seems unlikely that European control of southern Africa will be terminated."

The Future of Africa South

By CHRISTIAN P. POTTHOLM

Assistant Professor of Government and Legal Studies, Bowdoin College

IN ADDITION to the Africa portrayed in the other essays of this issue, there is another portion of the continent which merits our attention. This is the Africa south of the Zambezi river, that part of Africa still under European settler and European colonial control or domination. It is a considerable and vital area, including 2 million square miles and containing a total population of 40 million persons. There are nine units which make up the subsystem, Africa South, and which exhibit a great deal of economic, political, military and diplomatic interaction. Five of the units—South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia (or Zimbabwe) and Southwest Africa (or Namibia) are under direct European control and four of the units—Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and Malawi—are under their considerable economic and political influence.¹

¹ Rhodesia and Southwest Africa are the names given to these territories by their European rulers; Zimbabwe and Namibia are the names used by many African nationalists.

² In this endeavor, I have attempted to divorce my personal preferences from my estimation of what will probably take place. Stated quite simply, I should prefer to see the units in question come under African majority rule and integrate their respective economies to insure a more equitable distribution of goods and services throughout the subsystem of southern Africa. I should also like to see this transition take place peacefully but am in no sense opposed to the use of force in order to attain African majority rule. As this article indicates, however, I see little chance of these goals being attained in the foreseeable future (that is, over the next decade) without Great Power intervention in opposition to the *status quo*.

This region contains over four million Europeans, 90 per cent of the total European population of Africa. Led by South Africa, its highly developed economy dominates the southern one-fifth of the continent, not only in terms of exports and imports, but also in terms of migrant labor. Much has been written about this portion of the continent, and great concern has been shown for its future. Yet there have been few attempts systematically to explore that future, and it is important to examine some of the possibilities inherent in the existing constellation of forces in the area, and to analyze the probable course of events which could develop in the next decade.²

Given the present situation and the relative levels of European control, any meaningful changes in the southern African context must involve a shift from European minority rule to African majority rule, both over the individual units and over the entire nine-unit subsystem. Therefore, I shall explore the future of the area under two broad headings; first, the maintenance of the *status quo* of European control, and second, the alteration of that *status quo* either by peaceful or violent means. There are a number of possibilities inherent in each general category.

MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO

In the first place, there are at least three principal variations of the *status quo* that would result in the maintenance of European

hegemony into the foreseeable future. One such possibility involves the continuation of an inconclusive struggle to liberate the areas of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. At the present time, although they are paying a high price in terms of manpower and treasure, the Portuguese seem to have checked the various African liberation movements such as the *Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio* (G.R.A.E.) and *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (M.P.L.A.) in Angola and the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) in Mozambique.³ The situation could change, of course, but for the present, these movements have been prevented from spreading from their rural, sparsely populated bases. Further, South African support for the Rhodesian government and its willingness to use whatever force seems necessary to maintain white supremacy in Southwest Africa has resulted in a marked deescalation of the conflict there. One could well argue that in these areas—as well as in South Africa herself—the African national movements were more active and more powerful in the late 1950's and early 1960's than they are today. In addition, the African-led areas of Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and Malawi have actively discouraged liberation movements from operating in or near their territories, and in March, 1970, a new customs agreement between South Africa and Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana went into effect.⁴ While increasing the amount of revenue accruing to those African states, it nevertheless more tightly binds them to the existing order of southern Africa. Thus, it should be recognized that the present situation may well continue into the foreseeable future.

In fact, an additional possibility exists that the European-controlled subsystem will not only maintain itself but will actually expand its influence. Should the African nationalist movements fail to enlarge their base of sup-

³ The interested reader should consult the special issue devoted to the struggle in Portuguese-controlled Africa in *Africa Report*, Vol. XV, No. 5 (May, 1970).

⁴ "Customs Union Agreement Between the Governments of Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, and South Africa," *Swaziland Government Gazette*, Vol. VII, No. 387 (December, 1969).

port or to achieve discernible success and should Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia continue to implement their plans for a "forward strategy," the zone of European influence might well increase. While it is true that Zambia, once a tenth unit in the subsystem, has increasingly sought to reorient her trade, security arrangements and communications network away from the southern African area and toward East Africa, a number of African states seem willing to abandon any serious attempts to alter the *status quo* in exchange for economic and technical aid, increased trade and more open lines of communications. Whether they are acting out of an appreciation for the "realities" of their relative impotence to change the course of events in southern Africa, or because of the increasing priority of their domestic needs, the Malagasy Republic, Mauritius, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Senegal and Ghana have expressed an interest in a "reexamination" of their relationship with southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular.

Buoyed by a gross national product of over \$12 billion and a rapidly growing economy, South Africa seems able to offer substantial economic rewards for any future cooperation. In addition, as the recent Portuguese foray into Guinea suggests, the Europeans could also mount threatening military and paramilitary attacks into Zambia and Tanzania should their support of African exiles increase to a point where it threatened Africa South. This does not mean that additional African countries will come under direct European rule, but it does suggest that the opportunities for the white regimes to bolster their positions by undercutting African opposition may markedly increase over the course of the next few years. Faced with a generally impotent Organization of African Unity and the indifference of the Great Powers, African states may have few opportunities to influence the course of events in southern Africa except in the most indirect and marginal way.

At the same time, should any of the European regimes face defeat by African nationalist movements, the total area under white control could well diminish, although this

would not necessarily alter the basic character of Africa South or influence the amount of European control over the remaining units. In this regard, the Portuguese-controlled areas might prove to be the most vulnerable. With over 45 per cent of their current budget allocated to "defense," the Portuguese probably could not expand their commitment to Angola and Mozambique by a great deal. The struggle for African independence in southern Africa, moreover, would receive a boost if the forces of the *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* led by Amilcar Cabral were able to achieve victory in Guiné (Bissau). Such a victory might well hasten Portugal's reappraisal of her colonial situation and lead to some type of accommodation with the forces of African nationalism in Angola and Mozambique.

Nevertheless, contrary to popular belief, such an accommodation would not necessarily entail the overthrow of the remaining European regimes. In the first place, were Africans to come to power in Angola and Mozambique, there would be no guarantee they would not emulate their counterparts in Malawi or Botswana and cooperate with European (i.e. white African) regimes. Secondly, Portugal's willingness to negotiate for African majority rule would not necessarily bind her European subjects in Angola and Mozambique to any decisions made in Lisbon. Some sort of European declaration of independence in Angola and Mozambique à la Rhodesia, or South African support for partition (for example, Mozambique might be divided into an African northern zone and a European-controlled southern zone) might well blunt any further thrust of African control over the entire subsystem. In short, it would appear that while various African movements might come to power in portions of the subsystem at some point in the future, this would not *ipso facto* lead to the alteration of the entire subsystem. In fact, the odds

seem to indicate that for the foreseeable future at least some version of the present European-dominated regional system will remain.

It will remain, that is, unless certain key variables are introduced, variables currently not present in the situational context of southern Africa. One such variable would involve increased European sentiment for a peaceful transition to African majority rule. This would involve not only Portugal's surrender of her African colonies, but also the willingness of Europeans in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and the Portuguese-held areas to turn over the governments of their respective units to African majority rule. Such a basic shift in attitudes seems incredible at the present time. There is, moreover, absolutely nothing in the recent political history of the area to suggest that more than a handful of Europeans in any of the units would favor such an outcome.⁵ At best, the Europeans seem willing only to give the appearance of a sharing of national power (as in the recent Rhodesian constitution or the implementation of the Bantustan program in South Africa) and even here, the number of Europeans favoring such action is small. There does not seem to be the faintest hope that the Europeans who control Africa South will change their attitudes unless they are forced to do so.

Thus, far, we have treated the region of southern Africa as if it were more or less impervious to economic, military and political forces beyond the area (with the exception of Portugal). To date, this has been true. The Organization of African Unity has been unwilling or unable to change the situation and the Great Powers, particularly the United States, Great Britain and France have, if anything, tended to support the *status quo*.⁶ Yet these actors on the global stage could decide that African majority rule should come to the area and that they would be willing to support African aspirations with non-violent forms of pressure such as diplomatic isolation and economic boycotts. There are two problems associated with this approach. In the first place, many of the countries who might

⁵ See Stanley Uys, "South Africa Shifts," *Africa Report*, Vol. XV, No. 8 (November, 1970), pp. 5-8.

⁶ William Hance (ed.), *Southern Africa and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

have a decisive economic impact on Rhodesia and South Africa are unwilling to bear the costs of such action (the costs would range from considerable, in the case of Great Britain, to marginal, in the case of the Soviet Union). Perhaps more important, as long as South Africa in particular remains rich and powerful with resources and products the rest of the world needs and wants, some levels of force would have to be used to make any economic boycott succeed. Hence, to look for a peaceful alteration of the *status quo* in southern Africa by the actions of the Great Powers seems unrealistic.

POSSIBLE USE OF FORCE

At the same time, if one considers the use of force by powers beyond the confines of southern Africa, an entire range of possibilities opens up. There is not room within the scope of this essay to cover all the possibilities inherent in the use of force by powers outside the subsystem in order to change its complexion, except to indicate that these possibilities extend along a wide spectrum ranging from a modest use of force (including a partial blockage of specific units), to a substantial one (limited air strikes against military targets), to an overwhelming one (full-scale invasion). Several examples should give the reader an opportunity to appreciate the textural richness surrounding the introduction of force by any or all of the three sets of powers capable of altering the *status quo* today: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the principal countries of West Europe, i.e., Great Britain and France.

These Great Powers, of course, could choose not to intervene on the side of those forces advocating change in southern Africa. To date, their inaction and economic support

⁷ This clearly lies far in the future. See John Seiler, "Making Southern African Policy in the Nixon Administration," paper prepared for delivery at the African Studies Association meeting, October, 1970.

⁸ See, for example, the pioneering work of Charles C. Diggs, Jr., and Lester L. Wolff, *Report of the Special Study Mission to Southern Africa August 10-30, 1969* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1969).

have strengthened the *status quo*. Yet the situation could change over the next decade, with the Soviet Union intervening with increasing support for the African nationalist movements and the Western Powers remaining neutral. Or the United States could intervene in order to force an acceptance of African majority rule. An even more complex—and dangerous—situation could develop with one set of Great Powers intervening on the side of the *status quo* and another set intervening militarily to alter it. It is perhaps instructive in this regard to note that while some of the African liberation movements fear the future military involvement of the United States on the side of the European minorities, many white South Africans fear the reverse.

Considering the \$800 million of United States private investment in South Africa, its strategic location astride world trade routes, and the fact that South Africa, like the United States, is controlled by persons of European extraction, what could cause the United States to intervene forcefully to change the *status quo*? Even though Africa is currently a low priority item in terms of United States foreign policy, I would argue that the future may well hold increasing and mounting pressures for the United States to intervene on the side of the African liberation forces.⁷ This will probably develop quite apart from Soviet or Chinese influence in the area and in spite of the present United States disengagement from some of its involvements throughout the world. If black Americans become increasingly organized and politically aware and link their destinies to those of other non-Europeans in the Third World, South Africa will become a principal, highly visible target. I recognize that at this moment in time, such concern, let alone a method for influencing the foreign policy making process of the United States, is largely lacking, but over the next decade, it may well increase.⁸

One might well point to an analogy with the role of Jewish Americans and the creation and maintenance of the state of Israel. Prior to World War II, there was little meaningful pressure for the creation of a Jewish state on

the part of American Jews, but in a relatively short time so much pressure developed that the United States is now intimately involved in the support of the state of Israel. In much the same fashion, black Americans could make the liberation of southern Africa a priority item. Even if this pressure were not sufficient to insure United States intervention in southern Africa on the side of the African nationalists, it should certainly be sufficient to prevent military support for the European regimes of that area. Because the Soviet Union is currently the primary supplier of weapons and equipment for the more prominent African liberation groups, such genuine neutrality on the part of the United States could be of enormous consequence in the future.⁹

But leaving aside the complicated (and at this point highly speculative) aspects of who could or would intervene, assuming Great Power intervention on the side of those forces favoring an alteration of the *status quo*, what chance is there that such a course of action would fundamentally change the complexion of southern Africa? In this regard, I would argue that getting the Great Powers to intervene is a far more crucial variable than the ability of such intervention, once generated, to alter the subsystem. The European governments of southern Africa have gotten a great deal of mileage out of their strategic locations, their long histories of rule in Africa and, in the case of the Afrikaners in South Africa, their struggle for national identity and their reputation for tenacity and toughness. Despite these traditions and the current strength of the European forces, I do not believe that the European regimes in southern Africa could prevent the forceful alteration of the subsystem if several of the

⁹ Soviet aid has concentrated on the loosely organized alliance of forces seeking to overthrow the European armies, *The Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas* (C.O.N.C.P.), which includes the M.P.L.A., FRELIMO, P.A.I.G.C. and the African National Congress of South Africa and the Zimbabwe African National Union. For further background on the various movements within C.O.N.C.P., see Paul M. Whitaker, "The Revolutions of 'Portuguese' Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (April, 1970), pp. 15-35.

Great Powers made that alteration a priority goal.

The present ability of these regimes to maintain themselves in the face of hostile majorities within their own territories and international opprobrium outside depends in large part upon the passivity of their subject populations. Such passivity rests on the fundamental assumption apparently shared by most Africans in southern Africa, namely, that in the face of the weapons monopoly enjoyed by the Europeans and their willingness to use whatever force seems necessary to crush all movements for social and political change, the system cannot be overthrown. This African assumption, so fundamental to the continued European control of southern Africa, would be contradicted by any meaningful signs of Great Power intervention—blockage, air attacks on military targets, or guarantees of physical sanctuaries on the borders of the European areas or within Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho.

To date, the European security forces in southern Africa have proven themselves to be effective against unarmed civilians and small groups of poorly organized, ill-equipped guerrillas. They have not faced anything like the levels of force involved in Great Power intervention. Were such force forthcoming, it is probable that despite all rhetoric to the contrary, the European domination of Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa would come to an end.

THE COST OF REVOLUTION

Yet such profound alteration of the subsystem would involve a substantial cost, primarily, although not exclusively, in African lives. It seems clear that any attempt to overthrow the European regimes by force would result in the death of large numbers of

(Continued on page 178)

Christian P. Potholm is the author of *Four African Political Systems* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970) and the co-editor of the forthcoming *Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics*, to be published by the Free Press.

"If Haile Selassie abdicated in favor of his son, his personal power and magnetism might well be strong enough to guarantee that the empire would survive the pressures of change. It is not, however, in the nature of powerful kings to give up their royal thrones." As this author points out, after Haile Selassie, "an enormous political vacuum will develop" in Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian Perplex

BY BARBARA A. ALPERT
Assistant Editor of Geography, Encyclopaedia Britannica

ETHIOPIA, THE LAND OF THE KING OF KINGS, of the Conquering Lion of Judah, stretches across the Horn of Africa. A country of beauty and majesty, Ethiopia's rugged mountains, forbidding ravines, sparkling rivers and lakes, and fertile plains contrast sharply with the torrid Red Sea to the east and the barren Sahara to the west. Her beginnings reach back to the time when King Solomon's Israel was strong and the Queen of Sheba's empire was mysterious and powerful. Her culture is linked to that of the Fertile Crescent; her language is Semitic and her religion Christian.

Yet Ethiopia is also a part of the African continent and shares in the African desire to acquire the wealth and knowledge of the modern world. She is seeking to participate in the contemporary international economy and to compete for industrial wealth and cultural sophistication. Under the leadership of her Emperor, Haile Selassie I, she is attempting to shape her natural and human resources into a twentieth century mold.

Today, the country retains its system of absolute rule grounded in the power of a feudal aristocracy. The Emperor rules personally over an area of 471,776 square miles supporting approximately 24 million inhabitants. The Crown owns one-third of the country; the rest is divided between the nobles (about 10 per cent of the population)

and the Orthodox Church of Ethiopia. The holder of royal office is considered the "Elect of God" and traditionally is a member of the ruling Amhara people. Power has not passed from father to son, however, as in England, but has been awarded to the strongest family member. Historically, court struggles have on occasion been so intense that usurpation by other groups has occurred. Recognizing the dangers of such a situation in the modern world, Haile Selassie introduced a written constitution in 1961, guaranteeing the passage of his throne to his only surviving son, Asfa Wossen.

The dominant peoples of the Ethiopian highlands, the Amhara and Tigre, are believed to have come originally across the Red Sea from Southern Arabia. This Sabaean migration occurred in several waves possibly around the fifth century B.C. These peoples eventually built the powerful Kingdom of Axum, whose power stretched across the Red Sea and controlled trade between Rome and the Indian and Chinese markets. It was Sheba, or Saba, Queen of Axum, who journeyed to Israel and returned bearing the son of King Solomon. Tradition states that Sheba sent her son back to Solomon for his education and that he returned, accompanied by the High Priest and the Ark of the Covenant. As Emperor Menelik I, he founded the Solomonid line.

Christianity reached Ethiopia about 330 A.D. through Frumentius of Syria. Although he arrived as a prisoner from a captured trading ship, he spread his religion throughout the ruling class and converted Emperor Ezana (c. 325-350 A.D.). Ethiopian culture thus became strongly linked to the Mediterranean world, her literature centering around religious texts. Her isolation from the Near East was completed by the advent of Islam. With the spread of Mohammed's doctrine to northern Africa, Ethiopia was surrounded by religious enemies. Secure in its natural highland fortress, the empire turned inward and concentrated on preserving its uniqueness in the Muslim sea.

MODERN ETHIOPIA

The modern Ethiopian empire was established by Menelik II, who ascended the throne in 1899. He confined the Italians to their territory in the extreme north, conquered the Galla, Sidama and Kaffa peoples of the south and west, and incorporated the Harar imamate in the east. He did not ignore the interests of the European powers, and secured his new possessions by treaties with France, Great Britain, and Italy.

The announcement of Menelik's death was followed by the accession first of Lij Yasu (1913-1916) and then of Empress Zaudity (1916-1930). On November 2, 1930, Ras Tessema Makonnen, Duke of Harar and heir apparent, ascended the throne and took the crown name of Haile Selassie (Strength of the Trinity) I.

The new Emperor was immediately faced with the difficulties of diplomacy in a world moving towards war. He was plagued by disputes with Italy over the borders of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. His efforts culminated in his famous plea for help at the League of Nations. Subsequently, however, the Italians invaded and occupied his country (1935-1941).

Since his throne was restored, Haile Selassie has attempted to bring his country into the modern world. He has promoted agricultural and industrial development, centralized the armed forces, promoted education and im-

proved medical facilities. Never ignoring international politics, he has fostered good relations with both Western and Eastern powers, and has made Addis Ababa the host city of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (E.C.A.), and the African regional office of the World Health Organization (W.H.O.).

THE ECONOMY

In 1970, two large development projects were initiated. At Metehara in the Awash Valley, the country's third sugar factory was opened. Built at a cost of \$55,000,000, it is larger than either the Wonji or Shoa factories and is expected to produce 65,000 tons annually. This will raise the combined production to 96,000 tons of sugar per year, which will be enough to fill domestic needs and allow for a small exportable surplus. In the Setit-Humera region of Begemdir Province, a 6,000-hectare plantation has begun production of sesame, cotton, and sorghum. It employs both Ethiopian and Sudanese workers, 40,000 of whom migrated there for the harvest. In addition to sugar, Ethiopia produces a profitable coffee crop.

In the industrial sector, the important Orbis Company has inaugurated its new, enlarged headquarters. Engaged in the repair and service of the growing number of automobiles, buses, trucks, tractors and varied equipment, it also trains Ethiopian mechanics and technicians. The Orbis Company was originally located in Addis Ababa, but it now also operates a branch in Asmara. A metal tool factory has been opened in Addis Ababa and a chemical detergent industry is to begin operations in 1971. Lagadadi Dam has begun to supply water to the national capital, six miles to the west. In the financial sphere, new income and land tax rates have been approved to provide for education and expanding social services.

The completion of the Addis Ababa Hilton Hotel symbolized growth in the tourist industry. Ethiopian Airlines (E.A.L.) has inaugurated a program of group tours along its historic route (Addis Ababa—Axum—Gondar)

designed for Ethiopian as well as foreign tourists. The restoration program for Lalibela's churches has been completed, increasing their appeal for tourists. The development of the Awash Valley and Gambela game reserves has continued, and work has begun on the Semien Mountain National Park in Eritrea.

In the medical field, Israel's Hebrew University contracted to establish a microbiology department at Haile Selassie I University to include teacher-training. United States military aid, through the United States base at Kagnew, Eritrea, has amounted to \$12 million.

In foreign affairs, the Emperor has continued his diplomatic efforts, making state visits to France and the U.A.R. In Nairobi on June 9, 1970, he and President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya signed a treaty delimiting their countries' 500-mile border. In 1970, the Emperor made his first visit to Italy since the Second World War. Visitors to Ethiopia in 1970 included President Podgorny of the Soviet Union (in a visit which marked an agreement on air services between the two countries) and President J. R. Bokassa of the Central African Republic, with whose country Ethiopia has agreed to establish communications links. In addition, the seventh summit conference of the O.A.U. was held in Addis Ababa and a UNESCO committee to draft an 8-volume African history was convened there in 1970.

ERITREAN CIVIL WAR

The Eritrean civil war continues to offer the most pressing internal challenge. In 1970, the Eritrean Liberation Front (E.L.F.) stepped up its terrorist activities in the south, east and north, attacks which were launched from bases in Saudi Arabia and the Sudan. The government continued to react in its established pattern of quick reprisal, limiting rebel activity by sheer military force. The army's efforts were aided by the fact that a schism began to develop within the liberation movement itself. While claiming to represent all northern Ethiopians, both Christian and Muslim, the front's Islamic sympathies

became more evident. Most of the outside support for the movement comes from surrounding Muslim countries. For this reason, the Christian membership has become increasingly suspicious of the movement's religious leanings.

Although Ethiopia's recovery from the devastation of World War II cannot be fairly compared with that of another Third World country, Japan, it has, nevertheless, been striking. Many of the symbols of "progress"—such as consumer industries, prestige construction projects and so on—have been achieved. The diplomatic consideration given to Ethiopia has also reflected her international standing. Despite her efforts, however, Ethiopia faces serious problems that must be solved in a historical context different from that which has nurtured the other sub-Saharan nations.

Most of modern black Africa is composed of nations which were carved out in the nineteenth century by European adventurers, traders and government officials. In consequence, local empires were broken up; tribes were forced apart; and previous identifications were subsumed. The colonial experience provided disparate peoples with a common focus and, therefore, a core for a new national identity. Along with the building of new economies and the acquisition of new knowledge, black African leaders were often able to replace old traditions with new unities.

Ethiopia is, however, the product of a different experience. She is the world's oldest continuing monarchy. Her political structure, based on an ancient feudal system, is ruled by the country's 225th emperor. Her cultural traditions are strong, viable and deeply steeped in the past. The Coptic Christian Church still acts as the main educator although it continues to declare that the earth is flat. Historic isolation has not only bred a suspicion of the foreign, but also a belief in the righteousness of retaining the Ethiopian identity. All this cannot be erased by a ruler whose very legitimacy is based upon history and a feudal social order.

The Emperor's dependence upon historical legitimization is underlined by the amount of

effort and monies expended in the development of historic sites. The churches of Lalibela, while important religiously and architecturally, gain their greatest significance as monuments to the past. They emphasize Ethiopia's early grandeur and the sophistication achieved before Europe experienced her Renaissance. They are evidence of the strength and wealth of the emperors and their importance as leaders of the Church. The ancient stele at Axum and the castles of Gondar are further testimonials to the legitimate right of power vested in the imperial throne.

ETHIOPIAN FEUDALISM

The Western world often has difficulty in understanding the functioning of absolute power. To the American mind, the system of absolutism is symbolized by the reign of Louis XIV of France. But the rule of modern dictators is never that clear-cut. Haile Selassie may hold the power of life and death over his subjects, but he must always consider the desires and attitudes of his nobility. Feudalism has a pyramidal structure: its power and loyalty emanate upward, and its obligations flow downward.

Therefore, the Emperor's list of priorities must begin with his most powerful nobles and end with his least significant vassals. Development projects must be designed to cause the least amount of pressure on those men whose interest lies in retention of the old order. It is often presented as axiomatic that an agricultural country must first concern itself with land reform. It is said that before Ethiopia can enter the modern economy she must drastically alter her system of vassalage under which ninety per cent of the nation is composed of tenant farmers who must share their produce with their feudal lord and pay him their first allegiance. What is needed, reformists often say, is to nationalize all land holdings and create a form of socialism, comparable perhaps to that of President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere's Ujamaa system.

But this could not be accomplished without destroying the power base of the men whom Haile Selassie must consider first. Wealth and position are still tied irrevocably

to land holdings. To take them away would create a political vacuum and undermine the country's political and social structure.

Projects like that of the Metehara sugar factory and the Setit-Humera development are valuable because they will provide the government with foreign exchange capital. They are, however, a compromise rather than a solution to Ethiopia's problem. Both projects are foreign operated—the former by the Dutch, the latter by Italians. They involve Ethiopians themselves only by offering them a cash alternative to tenancy. The workers still do not own their land or control their destinies. Instead, they trade an Ethiopian landlord for a foreign establishment that controls their wages, housing, and medical and educational opportunities. The projects, therefore, may swell the amount of circulating monies, but do not alter the fact that the average Ethiopian remains an illiterate, landless vassal.

Industrial development is also marked by cultural stumbling blocks. Whereas an industrial economy fosters the growth of a new middle class, in Ethiopia the members of the middle class are drawn from the landed gentry. Although they fully understand the earning capacity of industry, they also still believe that wealth means land. Instead of engaging in capital reinvestment, they use their profits to buy more land. If acquired in the countryside, land means entry into the feudal system and the acquisition of local political power. If urban property is bought, it is usually developed by building a home that can be rented to the foreign community; the profits are then invested in more land, not in business.

Ethiopians also have a strong cultural aversion to any association with labor. A man of political and social significance must not "dirty his hands" with physical toil. When a youth moves to the city, the first thing he does is to grow the nail of the small finger of his right hand, an indication of his disassociation with labor—an attitude similar to that of the ancient Chinese courtiers. It is therefore difficult to expect an Ethiopian of substance to "pitch in" and work personally to

ward the development of a new business or industry. He prefers to hire foreign experts and personnel to run things for him. In fact, the expanded automobile repair service mentioned previously was founded and is still owned and operated by European immigrants. The metal tool factory was opened with Polish assistance and the detergent industry is Greek financed.

These intrinsic difficulties in developing an industrial Ethiopia are further complicated by a well-entrenched and well-oiled system of bureaucratic graft. An example is the case of a wealthy Ethiopian importer who wanted to open a small factory to produce an item previously imported duty free. He was harassed by demands for "payments" for the necessary license, sudden new duties on the imported ingredients of his products and a \$90-a-day storage fee on those same items which were held at the postoffice for 9 months. The man was nearly broken both financially and spiritually, but was able to open on a small scale after all payments were made. An interesting sidelight to this story was his plan to withhold the "Made in Ethiopia" stamp until the item had an established market. He knew that the Ethiopian public has more trust in imported items and would avoid his product as inferior if it were aware that it was made at home.

EDUCATION

Ethiopia's economic difficulties are further complicated by a 90 per cent illiteracy rate and a woeful lack of Western medical knowledge and facilities. The Emperor has greatly expanded the educational system where none existed before his reign. The government offers a monthly stipend to teacher-training, clerical and university students, the recipients of which must spend four years at country-side locations. The American Peace Corps has also been a strong element in bringing schools to outlying locations. It is difficult, however, to persuade a farmer to give up time in the fields to sit in a classroom or to relinquish his son's labor to intellectual pursuits.

In addition, literacy often brings a desire

to move to the city and abandon the agricultural life, thus disrupting societal patterns and patterns of expectation. A youth may abandon his home for an urban center, only to find little employment available. He has staked his personal integrity upon becoming a "city person" and finds it difficult to return home merely as a literate farmer.

DANGEROUS IDEOLOGY

Western education is also often a source of ideas inimicable to the sustenance of a feudal system. A lucky few, usually members of the aristocratic minority, receive their higher education in Europe, the United States, and occasionally the Soviet Union. There they become acquainted with ideas of democracy and communism. The attraction is obvious. (In fact, the men who engineered the Ethiopian coup d'etat of 1960 were educated at the University of Wisconsin.) Naturally, such modern ideology is not welcome in Ethiopia. It is true that Hamlet and Julius Caesar were performed in Addis Ababa (the former translated into Amharic) but the regicide scenes were played offstage. Foreigners and Ethiopians of suspicious persuasion are subject to harassment; their mail is censored and they are often followed. Although the government wants the skills and the technical knowledge of the developed world, their ideological bases are inevitably dangerous and for this reason foreign ideology must be cautiously suppressed.

The medical situation in Ethiopia is deplorable by Western standards. Most Ethiopians are subject to malaria, trachoma, venereal disease, schistosomiasis, amoebic dysentery and tape worm. Most of the country's 400 physicians are located in Addis Ababa and Asmara. The new medical school is producing a trickle of Ethiopian doctors, but they prefer the comforts of a city practice. The rest of the nation must be content with clinics manned by "dressers," i.e., people with a grade-school education trained in first aid. Drugs are few and expensive, and medical equipment is confined to the cities' hospitals.

The medical situation is further complicated by the lack of knowledge of the germ

theory on which Western medicine is based. It is difficult to explain germs to a man who has never looked through a microscope. Boiling water over a wood fire at high altitudes is an inconvenience and the reasons behind such action remain a mystery. The average man goes to a Western doctor only when all else has failed, when his condition has deteriorated and a cure may be impossible. The spread of both curative and preventive medical practices is thus greatly hampered by a lack of understanding and a suspicion of the foreign.

And so it becomes evident that the prospects for Ethiopia's rapid entry into the modern world are dim. Ethiopia will either follow a patient, plodding course toward established goals or experience an abrupt, painful and revolutionary change. The latter is more attractive to impatient intellectuals and to those nations to whom a new government would be favorable. Castro-like activities attract those who feel that the Emperor has "sold out" to his nobility and to those wanting change for their own advancement.

The Eritrean Liberation Front is not a member of this faction, because its members desire secession and autonomy, not a transformation for the entire nation. Rather, a reformist movement would be backed by men who cannot advance past the entrenched elite. They are few in number and the government is well aware of their existence, repressing them as political enemies or seducing them with lucrative government positions.

ADROIT DIPLOMACY

International interference is held in check by the Emperor's adroit diplomatic ability. Always favoring friendship with the Western powers, he has not ignored the interests of the East European countries. It is true that the existence of Kagnew Air Force Base indicates an alignment with the United States; however, it can also be viewed as an arrangement of convenience. Ethiopia has provided the United States with a well placed communications base. But the base can also be used as a bid for Eastern capital and technical skills. This is a game played

throughout the Third World. If the United States builds a hospital, the U.S.S.R. provides a type of medical Peace Corps. If friendship is professed with the U.A.R., Israel may send in technicians and architects. If West Europe provides trade links, so do the Eastern satellite countries.

Far more difficult is the problem posed by the interest of Ethiopia's Muslim neighbors in promoting the Eritrean civil war. However, the Arab-Israeli conflict is channeling energies elsewhere, and internal repression is capable of keeping the conflict under control. Meanwhile, the inevitable growth of Muslim-Christian suspicions within the Liberation Movement strengthens the hand of the Ethiopian government.

Government stability will be seriously threatened only by general popular dissatisfaction. The seeds of discontent exist, of course. The peoples of the south, east and west—the Galla, Sidama, Adari and Danakili—do not directly share in economic progress. They are held in the social position of conquered peoples and often dream of liberation from their Amhara overlords. But it must be noted, and with some emphasis, that these feelings are usually directed toward the immediate landlord or local political boss. The Emperor himself holds an elevated position. He is the elect of God and is not personally responsible for an unhappy state of affairs.

Haile Selassie himself embodies Ethiopia. His well fostered charisma and tight political control ensure the continuance of his rule. The abortive coup of 1960 was carried out while he was out of the country. When he returned four days later, the revolutionaries fled and he regained complete control. There is little question about his ability to hold this

(Continued on page 179)

Barbara A. Alpert served in the Peace Corps in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where she taught English and history at a private high school. She also worked for the Ethiopian National Literacy Campaign and studied Amharic, the national language. Upon her return to the United States, she joined the editorial staff of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

In Nigeria, "The federal government gave the impression in 1970 that it was preoccupied with the tasks of developing the country's economy and taking cautious steps towards the restoration of civilian rule."

The Federation of Nigeria

BY DAVID J. MURRAY

Professor of Government, The Open University, Bletchley, England

THE ECONOMIST of London recently headed a review of Nigerian affairs "Nigeria Starts Again."¹ This headline reflects European and American thinking about what 1970 meant for Nigeria. The civil war came to an end in January. This event brought to a close one stage in Nigeria's history, providing the opportunity for her to start again. To interpret the year in this way, however, is to overemphasize the significance of the civil war and to place too much stress on the work of ending the war in the developments of 1970. Of more central importance have been the preparation of a national development plan and the outline of a program for a return to civilian rule.

Nigeria is a federation and operates as one even under her military rulers. Up to a point the process of recuperating from the effects of the civil war has been a matter for the states most immediately affected. In the South East, Rivers and Mid West States, fighting had very largely ceased in 1969, and in these states the process of reestablishing administration, organizing relief, starting services again and stimulating economic activity was already well under way before the civil war came to an end. For these states the ending of the war has enabled a formal distribution of the assets of the former Eastern Region to be agreed on, but otherwise during 1970 they have been building on their earlier work.

The East Central State government has assumed the tasks of providing relief for the Ibos and of reintegrating the Ibos into Nigeria. It was from among the Ibos that Biafra drew nearly her entire support, and it is in this area of the East Central State that the greatest damage occurred. Three years of war have had their effects, and the East Central State government under its administrator, Ukpabi Asika, has had to deal with the problems.

Immediately after the war, a variety of agencies, Nigerian and foreign, rushed aid to the area amid stories of widespread starvation. Malnutrition was and remains a problem, and relief has continued, organized increasingly under the direction of the state government. Malnutrition, however, and the international criticism of the limited action taken immediately by Nigerian governments to alleviate it, was only the consequence of other problems: a total breakdown in the machinery of government and administration in the areas formerly controlled by the secessionists, too little money in circulation to stimulate the economy, large numbers of unemployed including many with skills normally at a premium in developing countries (of 32,000 unemployed civil servants in the state, there are 6,000 from the senior grades and these include geologists, accountants and doctors), and a population that is too large to be supported by an agricultural economy.

The extent of the problems produced arguments that initially the state should be ad-

¹ *The Economist*, October 24, 1970.

ministered by the federal government but these arguments were turned down: the Ibos, it was decided, were not to be treated differently either as second class citizens or as citizens on whom it was fair to devote a disproportionately large amount of attention. The East Central State government would have to deal with its own problems; all the functions belonging to it under the Constitution were to be exercised by this state government and it was thus provided with the legal authority to act.

During 1970, the East Central State government has made some headway in tackling the problems facing it. It has built up a local administration so that, for example, it can begin to organize local development programs, and local treasuries can now once more pay the salaries of local teachers. Shortage of money remains a critical problem. The federal government put £N4 million in circulation when it handed out £N20 each to 200,000 holders of Biafran currency, and the spending of approximately 75,000 troops in the area provides further assistance. But this is insufficient to revitalize the economy, and the state government looks to the federal government and foreign investors for help.

Meanwhile, the government is using a variety of schemes to produce economically worthwhile activity and reduce unemployment. It has, for instance, established a Work For Tools program under which equipment is lent for such work as plumbing, transport and metalwork and which becomes the property of the borrower when the work is completed to the satisfaction of an inspector. A Food For Work program is similarly resulting in beneficial public works and agricultural development schemes. Among its other activities the state government is directing considerable attention to agricultural development and it has plans for producing so large a harvest in September-October, 1971, that no further relief food will be required. Beneficial as such an achievement would be, it is estimated that it would only reduce the percentage of unemployed in the population by 5 per cent to 15 per cent. Industrial development provides the hoped for

outlet for the major part of the unemployed, and much trust is placed in the availability of skills and the reputation of Ibos as adaptable and hard workers to attract industry to Aba, Enugu and other centers in the state.

An alternative approach to a solution of the problems of the East Central State is for part of its population to migrate once more to other parts of the country. Instead of waiting for the state government to provide employment locally, Ibo people might move to centers of employment as they have in the past. They have been encouraged to return to the northern states by the appropriate state governments, and some have done so; many have sought reemployment in Lagos and in the Mid Western and Western States. By now, however, the places they formerly occupied have in many instances been taken by others. It is principally in the Rivers State, and particularly in the important port and industrial center of Port Harcourt, and to a lesser extent in the South Eastern State that there remains an acute shortage of suitable labor where Ibos could be usefully employed. But the long-standing resentment of past Ibo domination—both political and economic—coupled with the brutality they have suffered at the hands of Biafra makes the people of the Rivers State and, to a lesser extent, of the South Eastern State understandably reluctant to allow Ibos back. This is one area where the federal government's policy of waiting for the appropriate states to sort out the problems resulting from the war is producing an impasse.

For all its difficulties, the East Central State government has made progress in the task of reestablishing the Ibos of what was called Biafra as an integral component of Nigeria. The state government is tolerated and does not depend overtly on the troops stationed there. The idea, moreover, that the Nigerian opponents of Biafra were committed to genocide either by the bullet or by starvation is recognized for what it was—a skilfully exploited piece of deception. Although the state government cannot claim any high degree of committed support among the people of the state, at the least there

seems to be little hankering after Biafra, and the leaders in that venture stand in disrepute.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The federal government gave the impression in 1970 that it was preoccupied with the tasks of developing the country's economy and taking cautious steps towards the restoration of civilian rule. Its attitude towards the civil war seems to have been that it was an inconvenient aberration, not to be taken so seriously that it required prolonged attention and reflection once the fighting had stopped. With the war at an end, energies that had been diverted to affairs directly connected with the conflict could be devoted to the proper tasks of government. Thus the main attention of government during 1970 was not devoted to the aftermath of Biafra but to keeping the wheels of government running and dealing pragmatically with the task of developing the country's economy and preparing the ground for a return to civilian rule.

The economy emerged from the war in a condition where rapid growth could be foreseen; its underlying strength had been indicated by the way it had weathered two and a half years of an expensive and disruptive war. The economy rests on agriculture. In the last full year of peace (1965-1966), 55 per cent of the gross domestic product was accounted for by agriculture, but agricultural production is diversified and does not therefore leave the country as exposed as countries that are dependent on the fortunes of a single crop. The country is self-sufficient in food-stuffs and it exports six major products. Cocoa continues to be the most important agricultural export, but groundnuts are significant and cotton and rubber have grown in importance. Palm produce came mainly from the area of the three eastern states and the Mid Western State and so suffered during the war, but timber continued to be important. Agriculture provides at present the backbone of the economy and there is considerable opportunity for further expanding production. Of 225 million acres in the country about 20 million are under crop. The

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations estimates that beyond this 10 per cent under crop a further 27 per cent of the land is suitable for agriculture, and 79 per cent of the total land area could be made suitable for production. There remains, therefore, a great potential for increased agricultural production.

Beyond agriculture, the economy benefits significantly from exports of tin and columbite, but these have become of minor importance in comparison with petroleum products. By 1969, despite the war, oil was already by far the largest foreign exchange earner. In April, 1970, production reached 1 million barrels a day; in May, Nigeria became the tenth largest producer of oil in the world; and it appears that the target of 2 million barrels a day by 1975 will be reached three years early. As more companies join in the search for oil and oil is found in commercial quantities over a widening area centering on the Niger Delta, oil is providing the basis for predictions that Nigeria has the greatest potential for becoming, if nothing else, the richest of the poor countries of the world.

Besides agriculture and mining, manufacturing industry is beginning to make an important contribution to the economy. Manufacturing industry still accounts for under 12 per cent of total domestic output, but it has developed fast in the past three years and is one sector that has benefitted from the war. Controls over imports and the use of foreign exchange, which were introduced or extended during the war, gave protection to local industries and provided an opportunity for new industries to establish themselves. As a result, Nigeria's industrial production in 1968 had reached the prewar level despite the absence of any contribution from the area of the eastern states, and between 1968 and 1969 it expanded by 40 per cent. The local production of consumer goods as a substitute for imports is now advancing rapidly.

The healthy state of the economy and its potential for growth provide the background for Nigeria's plans for economic development. One of the government's achievements dur-

ing 1970 was the initiation of a National Development Plan in October to cover the period up to 1974. The plan is national: each of the 12 states prepared plans for its state and these were coordinated and integrated into a plan for the whole country by the federal government. Unlike previous plans, moreover, there appears to be an attempt at realism in predicting estimates of the resources and foreign exchange which will be available during the plan period.

The National Development Plan envisages an investment of £N1,595 million in the plan period, of which about £N780 million is to be in the public sector. Something under half of this is to be spent by the federal government with the remainder distributed among the states. First priority in this spending is to be given to developing the infrastructure: £N170 million is marked for transport, £N42 million for communications; £N45 million for power facilities. In practical terms, this investment should result in very necessary improvements in the railway and road system. It will involve developing the four towns of Lagos, Warri, Port Harcourt and Calabar as Nigeria's major ports, and the road system connecting them with the hinterland. There will be a microwave telephone network connecting the principal towns, and communication will be extended by means of a communications satellite station. The serious problems arising from intermittent and fluctuating power supplies are to be eased through the extension of an electricity grid system for the west and south, drawing on power from the Kainji hydroelectric plant. Elsewhere improvements will be dependent on modernizing and standardizing individual power stations.

A second priority in the National Development Plan is further to encourage industrial development. Import substitution will be extended with, for example, the establishment of an automobile assembly plant and a petrochemical industry. There will also be moves to develop industries to make use of Nigeria's agricultural production—for processing cocoa, groundnuts and palm produce, making cloth from cotton and floor tiles from

rubber. And the government is committed to building an iron and steel complex.

There are difficulties inherent in this economic development. There are question marks over the plans for developing the infrastructure: whether even the degree of investment projected will allow for repairing the serious deterioration suffered during the war and for improvements at a rate that keeps pace with demand. Industrial expansion also has its problems. There are limits to effective import substitution. After local production of soap, candles, cloth and beer come capital goods, and here the shortage of research and technical skills and, above all, the relatively small size of the market create difficulties and raise questions about the viability of the proposed iron and steel complex, automobile assembly plants and fertilizer industry.

PLANS FOR CIVILIAN RULE

In answer to all such questions, the economic prospects for the country are bright, but they are dependent on political circumstances. The civil war indicated all too clearly that economic and social development are conditional on a degree of public order and popular acceptance of government decisions. The success of plans further to develop the economy requires more than negative acceptance of government; it depends on positive cooperation. The Head of State, Major General Yakubu Gowon, stated this explicitly when announcing the development plan:

Implementing the plan requires national discipline. It requires concentration on our chosen priorities and mobilising the support and energies of the people to attain the ambitious targets which we have set for ourselves . . . it is equally necessary in the national interest to lay the foundations during the next few years for more even development in the country as a whole both economically and educationally. We must not allow the continued existence of sharp contrasts of development and backwardness to threaten the stability of this country.

General Gowon was emphasizing one of the conditions which underlie Nigeria's political difficulties—the sharp differences among the states. There are disparities in

wealth between the oil-rich Rivers and Mid Western States and, on the other hand, Kwara, which is bereft of important export products and lacks major industries. There are significant differences in population and relative social development, and there are acute differences in educational development between, for example, the Western and North Western States. Imbalances, moreover, exist not simply among states, but among areas and communities: among, for instance, those in the northern part of the Western State and those in the southern half; between Bornu and the Yoruba-speaking peoples of Kwara State, and so on.

Such disparities lead to rivalries and tensions. The National Development Plan, hopefully, will deal with this underlying political problem by aiming at a greater equalization of development in the country. In addition, when he announced the National Development Plan, General Gowon outlined a program for a return to civilian rule, thus implicitly recognizing that government could not retain the support and cooperation it needed unless it recognized the need for popular participation and, ultimately, for popular control. The program also reveals an awareness that if effective government is to continue and if the country is to be saved from further disruptive conflicts, a return to civilian rule must be preceded by a series of decisions which, in default of army action, might produce endless wrangles and have harmful divisive effects on a civilian government. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Nigeria's national independence, General Gowon set out nine points in his program for a return to civilian rule:

- i reorganization of the armed forces
- ii implementation of a national development plan and repair of the damage and neglect of war
- iii eradication of corruption in national life
- iv settlement of the question of states
- v preparation and adoption of a new constitution
- vi introduction of a new revenue allocation formula
- vii a national population census
- viii organization of genuinely national political parties

ix organization of elections and the installation of popularly elected governments in the states and in the Center.

General Gowon also set 1976 as a target date for a return to constitutional government:

It must be done in such a manner that the final hand-over of government to elected representatives of the people may usher in a period of lasting peace and political stability. We must, therefore, not rush matters but proceed very carefully.

The nine-point program indicates a concern that the authority of the army settle deeply contentious questions so that a civilian government can be freed from such distractions and left to promote the well-being of the nation. Point four, settling the question of states, refers to the question of whether or not any of the existing states should be subdivided. The strongest agitation for this has come from the North Eastern State, where a considerable section of the population is eager to break away from the dominating presence of the Kanuri of Bornu or, alternatively, the Kanuri wish a separate state so that they can be masters in their own house and not be swamped by an erstwhile subject majority. There is also agitation in the Western State, where the northern Yoruba people resent the powerful position of southern Yorubas. The government has sought to quiet this agitation by promising that no change will be allowed in the next four years but that further consideration will be given to the issue prior to a return to civilian government.

An appropriate method of allocating revenue between the federal government and the states, and among the states, is a more immediate issue, and at the end of 1970 the federal government set up a new commission to make recommendations. Under the former federation, revenue was allocated principally on the basis that revenue was returned to the region from which it was drawn. Currently—since April, 1970—a different interim arrangement has been operating. The principle of derivation has been modified so that the size of the population in a state has come to count for more, but oil-rich states still occupy a strongly prefer-

ential position. Already one commission, the Dina Commission, has investigated the general problem and made recommendations to the military rulers, but its report has been buried. Whether the army will be able to enforce a solution to the knotty problem will be a measure of its continuing authority.

The effectiveness of the army and the efficiency of government will also be tested by the proposed population census. Since the number of people in an area is an important basis for the area's claims on government—in respect, for instance, to revenue allocation and the number of legislators it can elect—counting heads becomes a potentially explosive political activity. Of the two censuses held since independence, the first was rejected for political reasons, and the second was an important cause of the dissensions that led up to the attempted creation of an independent Biafra. In these circumstances, it is understandable that the army should feel obliged to hold a new census under its own authority before a return to civilian rule.

Because of the extent and complexity of the tasks to be completed under its authority the army rulers have thought it necessary to postpone a return to civilian rule until 1976. In so doing the army is valuing highly its own ability to make contentious decisions without causing disruptive dissension, while maintaining the cooperation between the people and government which is recognized as essential to the National Economic Development Plan. During 1970, doubts were expressed about the army's capacity to achieve such success.

THE PROBLEM OF INFLATION

The difficulties facing the military governments of the country are immense. Politics may be officially banned, but Nigerians are highly skilled and sophisticated political individuals. They are adept at non-political politics, and there are many reasons for their activity. Quite apart from the political maneuvering and tensions arising from disparities in wealth and development across the country—and from the pressure of a rapidly growing population on resources that

grow less speedily—there are immediate and pressing problems. Inflation and its consequences are acute. Since the beginning of the civil war, the cost of living index in Lagos has increased by 20 per cent, and the rise in the price of food has been even greater. The situation became so acute during 1970 that the federal government attempted to control prices in July and to place a ban on strikes and wage increases. But these actions were only temporary holding operations.

In 1969 and early 1970, the governments bought a measure of acceptance and cooperation from farmers by increasing the prices paid for export produce. In the Western State, farmers received a 50 per cent increase in the price paid for their cocoa, and in the savannah areas, the northern states marketing board has promised a considerably higher price for future purchases. A lull has also been bought among public employees through the appointment of a commission under Chief Simeon Adebo to review wages and salaries; and in the private sector employees are waiting for the results of this commission's deliberations, expecting increases to follow as they did after the last commission inquiry into wages and salaries in the public sector. During 1971, the clamor for increased prices from farmers—and even a return to the widespread popular disturbances that occurred in the Western State in 1969—may recur, and among employees both in the public and private sectors much agitation can be expected.

In dealing with the problems arising from inflation, disparities, pressures on resources and the many other continuing political problems, while at the same time seeking to organize a planned return to civilian rule, the governments of the country are hampered by certain internal weaknesses. Senior officials in the federal and many state governments are men of outstanding ability and deep commitment, whose contribution to the continued existence and development of Nigeria has been immense, but they are hindered by a diminished loyalty, efficiency and honesty among more junior staff. As one Nigerian newspaper noted:

the Federal civil service is in ruins. It has no leadership, discipline or direction. . . . in the Civil Service, idleness, absenteeism, and complete disregard for the authority of superiors by subordinates have hamstrung administration. Clearly something needs to be done about the Civil Service and done quickly. . . .²

The difficulties are most obvious in the federal civil service, but the problems are not confined there, and such weaknesses affect the capacity of government to achieve its stated objectives.

Governments at the federal level and in the states are also hampered by a noticeable decline in respect for them. The basic legitimacy of government has been, and continues to be, questioned. The reasons for this are various—the absence of politicians acting as brokers and mediators, the disruption in activity caused by the civil war and the creation of the new states and, not least, the unpopularity of the army, or at least what is seen of it in the streets, at roadblocks and at checkpoints.

FUTURE LEADERSHIP

Yet effective government coupled with the orderly return to civilian rule on the basis of action on each of the nine points set out seems most challenged by two different circumstances. First, at least in present circumstances it is doubtful whether the army as a whole is prepared to relinquish the position it has secured for itself. The army is estimated to number between 150,000 and 200,000 men and there has been no suggestion that it will be reduced. General Gowon has stated that it will be reorganized, but at the present rather than being reduced it is being strengthened as it is reequipped on a standardized basis. It is generally thought that this policy is being fashioned from within the body of the army. Nor has there as yet been a noticeable concern among soldiers occupying positions within the state to relinquish them. The more common talk is that army officers are enjoying the power and resulting personal enrichment to the full and are resisting to the utmost transfers to less ad-

vantageous positions. The power and position gained by soldiers will not be given up easily.

It will not, moreover, be easy to identify national political leaders to whom control of government can be transferred. Party politics is currently banned, but former politicians are associated with the military rulers, in the manner of ministerial heads of ministries, both in the federal and state governments. Politicians of importance are thus in positions of prominence but they are poorly placed to build up a new political constituency. In the past, politicians have founded their position on the support of a particular locality or more generally on linguistic groups—often popularly and misleadingly termed “tribes.” Now it is one point in the military government’s plan for a return to civilian rule that parties should, when they are once again permitted, be truly national. Maintaining or rebuilding political support in an overt way on a tribal basis is not therefore possible for politicians of national prominence; what is tolerated are attempts to rebuild political support on a new and nationwide foundation. Some quiet preparation is being made along these lines. Alhaji Aminu Kano, a former opposition politician from Kano, is attempting to put together an alliance of leading politicians drawn from across the country whose backing from the localities would be supplemented by ideological support for socialist principles and the attachment of

(Continued on page 179)

David J. Murray spent nearly 10 years teaching and conducting research at different universities in East, Central and West Africa, spending the longest period in Nigeria. His research interests lie in the fields of public and comparative administration and much of his attention has been directed to Africa. He has published more than a dozen articles and five books in this area, the most recent of which are *The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970) and (as editor) *Studies in Nigerian Administration* (London: Hutchinson, 1970).

² *New Nigerian*, October 5, 1970.

“... there is a common theme in the four major open elections in Ghanaian history—those of 1951, 1954, 1956 and 1969. . . .”

Politics and Factionalism in Ghana

BY RICHARD RATHBONE

*Lecturer in the Contemporary History of Africa,
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*

IN AUGUST, 1969, a general election was held in Ghana.¹ Its object was to find a civilian regime to succeed that military and police administration which had ruled the country since the ousting of President Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People's party government in February, 1966.² Most observers were agreed that the 1969 election was the first free general election since the last “colonial” election of 1956. About 50 per cent of those eligible to vote did so, and of these nearly 60 per cent voted

for the Progress party led by Kofi Busia, now Prime Minister of Ghana.³

In terms of ideology and in personnel, the Progress party bears a strong resemblance to the succession of right-wing political constellations which opposed the C.P.P. from its inception until such opposition was made illegal. The major party which contested the 1969 elections against the P.P. was the National Alliance of Liberals led by Komla Gbedemah who until he fell from favor was Nkrumah's political colleague and finance minister. Dennis Austin has written of the N.A.L. that they “were identified too closely . . . despite their avowals, with the former C.P.P. regime and its defects.”⁴ Consequently there is a temptation to see Busia's victory over what appears to have been something of a crypto-C.P.P.⁵ as a triumph of a middle-class party over what always claimed to be the workers' party. The error of such a conclusion is the burden of this article. I also hope to show that there is a common theme in the four major open elections in Ghanaian history—those of 1951, 1954, 1956 and 1969, namely, that of significant achievements of power by successful parties before electoral success itself.

In the first place, it is obvious that Ghanaian political parties have not been class parties.⁶ Austin points out in *Elections in Ghana, 1969*, that the *petit bourgeoisie* he elsewhere described⁷ as the backbone of the C.P.P. probably voted in strength for the apparently bourgeois Progress party in 1969.

¹ The best accounts I have seen of the election are in two articles by Professor Dennis Austin: “Progress in Ghana,” in *International Journal*, Vol. xxv, no. 3, Summer, 1970, and *Elections in Ghana, 1969*, published by the Indian Council for Africa (1970).

² There are many accounts of the coup d'état including far from objective books by the ex-President and by one of the *coupistes*, Brigadier Afrifa. On the interim period Professor Claude Welch's article on Ghana in *Current History*, May, 1969, is most useful.

³ 2,351,658 adults registered—nearly 80 per cent of the enfranchised population (nationals over 21 years of age). This was the highest registration in Ghana's electoral history. 1,493,351 votes were cast: i.e., 63.5 per cent of those registered, not of those eligible to vote.

⁴ Dennis Austin, *Elections in Ghana, 1969* (Indian Council for Africa, 1970), p. 7. Professor Austin is at present editing a volume on the 1969 elections.

⁵ It could only be a crypto-C.P.P. rather than an open one. The C.P.P. itself is a banned party and many of its one-time leading lights were unable to stand at the election even under other flags.

⁶ I have argued this in my article on the National Liberation Movement in *Opposition in African States* in the collected seminar papers series published by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, 1969.

⁷ See his *Politics in Ghana 1946–1960* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

Similarly, before independence, in 1955-1957, the mass support for the conservative, pro-federal National Liberation Movement differed very little from the mass support the C.P.P. enjoyed at that time. What then were the major distinctions between such apparently ideologically opposed parties? On the available evidence, it would appear that, at least until Nkrumah's restrictions on open opposition obscured reality, the Ghanaian political scene has been typified by a high degree of factionalism, a consequent rapid creation of political parties, and an equivalently rapid decline.⁸

The explanation of this situation is highly complex, but there are salient and relevant features which can be teased out. First, in any political formation in Ghana the desire for political office is not matched by the availability of such an office. In every period of Ghana's recent political history, far more activists have acquired political skills and ambitions than there have been offices to accommodate their aspirations. The revolt within the C.P.P. prior to the 1954 elections can certainly be understood in these terms, as can the break-up of the proto-P.P. in the prelude to the 1969 elections, when a number of previously friendly political figures like Modesto Apaloo and Joe Appiah left their former colleagues to form alternative parties.

ASPIRANT BUSINESSMEN

But probably more important than this factor of job competition and personal rivalry is the major question of the availability of economic resources to a group other than party activists. It is necessary to go beyond

⁸ See Rathbone, "Opposition in Ghana: the National Liberation Movement," *op. cit.*

⁹ I have argued the importance of this support group in my article, "Education and Politics in Ghana," in *Africana Collecta*, edited by Dieter Oberndorfer (Freiburg: 1968).

¹⁰ Visible, for example, in the remarkable increase in money in circulation. The West African Currency Board estimated that in note and coin there was £5,515,000 in circulation in 1939. By 1946, this figure had rocketed to £11,181,000. By 1947, it was £14,280,000. It should be remembered that, in conjunction with these figures, the 1940's marked a period of severe restriction in the availability of consumer goods as well as a period of very high prices for African products.

Austin's attempt to categorize the Ghanaian "political class"—his petit bourgeoisie—to show that the divisions within an albeit smaller group were and are decisive. This group can be called middle class, but to my mind this term fails analytically because it calls to mind an unwarranted Western analogy and because it fails to show significant areas of differentiation within the group.

Members of the group can more aptly be termed aspirant businessmen—aspirant because at the time of their greatest political power their degree of establishment has been markedly low and has in fact been the major cause of their political activism. Numerically they are small, yet they exercise influence beyond their apparent strength because of the slow rate of development of the Ghanaian economy.⁹ In such a situation, the job market expands extremely slowly and the potential employer, the aspirant businessman, is a figure of huge importance in the lives of those whose future is frustrated by the prospects of underemployment or unemployment. The aspirant businessmen have been a noticeable group since the 1940's when for the first time the hot-house economic conditions of World War II opened the possibility of capital-formation for a wider group of Africans.¹⁰ Capital was achieved by long periods of saving in relatively well paid employment, by careful and skillful minor entrepreneurial activity in the small-scale sector of retail business, or by family connections with, say, a cocoa farmer who invested his profits in an aspirant contractor or service industrialist.

The connection between such potential patrons and their clientele—prospective employees—is frequently that of kinship but may also stem from connections through village, town, ethnic group or school. The personal aspirations of such businessmen are not divorced from those of their clients. Thus, despite the obvious class differences between patron and client, their objective interests are often similar.

A CLOSED ECONOMY

The major frustration of an aspirant businessman in the 1940's was the closed nature

of the colonial economy. Government remained the major employer. In commerce, expatriate companies exploited their monopolistic position to exclude African competition almost completely.¹¹ The few African businessmen who had established themselves before World War II in the timber trade, for example, guarded their niche jealously. Much of the contract work at local government level was controlled by the Native Authorities, a system which, through the operation of indirect rule (which was not abandoned in favor of democratic local government until 1950), meant that traditional chiefs dominated contract allocation and hence employment. This closed economy had little room for the very many young businessmen who registered a large number of companies throughout the 1940's. They had capital but could make no progress so long as import licenses were denied them, and so long as the well established concerns squeezed them out.

The first major modern political party of the Gold Coast, the United Gold Coast Convention, represented the African professional class and the older established African businessman. Initially, the aspirant businessmen supported the Convention. But in time it became clear that supporting such a party involved supporting a group that was likely to be concerned with its own interests to the detriment of the interests of the new men. For example, the U.G.C.C. took a remarkably unprogressive line on local government reform because its business membership thrived on its relationship with the established Native Authorities. It was clear to the excluded business interests that a more radical economic future was their only hope. They looked not unnaturally to a program that would open contract allocation to their competition at all levels, that would oppose expatriate commerce and that would undercut the restrictive business practices of the

older established African businessmen. Just such a program was, of course, explicit in the plans of the Convention People's party, which was founded as a radical breakaway from the U.G.C.C. in 1949. The small businessmen were prominent in early support for the party, their relative financial strength being no mean asset to a party with little initial access to cash.

This faith in the C.P.P. program was to be vindicated even before the C.P.P.'s success at the polls in the first general election of 1951. Of great significance to the aspirant businessmen was the outcome of what Dennis Austin called "trial runs" namely, the pre-general election municipal elections in Accra (April, 1950), Cape Coast (June, 1950), and Kumasi (November, 1950). In these elections, the C.P.P. did remarkably well. In terms of the interests of the aspirant entrepreneur it won highly significant victories; as a result, contracts for all manner of local government works—school-building, latrine digging, supplying materials, and so on, went for the first time to new contractors. Even to those who had lacked faith in the C.P.P.'s ability to win the general election of 1951 or, more important, had doubted that the C.P.P. in power would in fact reallocate resources, there was proof well in advance of the big election of the C.P.P.'s abilities in both fields.

The net result of the C.P.P.'s victory in 1951, in terms of the economic changes which affected entrepreneurs, was that those who supported the C.P.P. profited from an electoral victory which not only secured them a foot in central government economic schemes but also (through the C.P.P.'s domination of local government) ensured them jobs at lower levels. But while the economy was opened to admit new groups, it was hastily closed against new entrepreneurs who were late-comers. Just as the 1940's had been a period of rapid capital accumulation so, too, were the early 1950's, a result partially of the boom in cocoa prices during the Korean War. And just as the pro-C.P.P. aspirant businessmen had clamored to be admitted to a tightly closed economic web before 1951, a new group of businessmen, similarly excluded, railed

¹¹ For more on this see, *inter alia*, Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion* (Monthly Review Press: 1966), Austin, *Politics in Ghana* (introductory chapter), and Rathbone, *The Transfer of Power in Ghana, 1945-57* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1968).

against the new exclusion. This was first visible in C.P.P. branches. In Ashanti, for example, which had done dramatically well during the cocoa boom,¹² after open revolt in some constituencies, a large number of unofficial candidates tried to stand for the C.P.P. without the party ticket.¹³ Such defection was clearly based on rivalry and job scarcity in the party. Yet it was also based on the fact that instead of benefits for the party as a whole from electoral success, the economic pay-offs were limited to a party "age-grade," a first generation which was as unwilling to allow competition as the established African entrepreneurs had been in the 1940's.

THE NEWLY DISCONTENTED

It is scarcely surprising that the newly discontented provided solid support for an opposition alliance called the National Liberation Movement, which flowered from 1955 to 1957.¹⁴ Although many other interests lay behind the N.L.M.—northerners suspicious of southern exploitation of their deprived region, cocoa farmers dissatisfied with Statutory Board prices, Ashanti nationalists—there is no doubt that the factors which led aspirant businessmen into the C.P.P. camp in the late 1940's and early 1950's also led a rising generation of businessmen into opposition by 1955.

The National Liberation Movement was

¹² It is significant that due to the rapid spread of the cocoa disease, Swollen Shoot, the major area of cocoa production had moved from the south-east around the market town of Koforidua to Ashanti, which duly profited from the southern farmers' distress. It was in Ashanti particularly that one found the new generation of capitalized but excluded entrepreneurs by 1955.

¹³ By May, 1954—the election was on June 10 and June 15—there were 1,005 claimants for C.P.P. nomination in 104 constituencies. Many subsequently stood down under pressure. Despite this, 103 "rebels" stood.

¹⁴ On the N.L.M. see Austin, *Politics in Ghana 1946-60*, chapters 6 and 7, Rathbone, "Opposition in Ghana: the National Liberation Movement," in *Opposition in African States* (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1969), and Rathbone, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-374.

¹⁵ See, for example, some of the business biographies presented in the *Report of the Commission appointed . . . to investigate . . . the assets of the persons specified in the first schedule to the National Liberation Council . . .* (the Sowah Commission, 1968).

dramatically successful in the 1956 general election, the last before independence. It was the only party in the country that brought new voters to the polls—some 60,000 of them in Ashanti alone. The C.P.P.'s general election victory of 1951 had been heralded by its success at the previous municipal elections; the consequences of those local government changes were both far reaching and encouraging for aspirant entrepreneurs. Similarly, the N.L.M.'s considerable success—in terms of votes rather than of overall seats—was foreshadowed by its gradual take-over of the Kumasi Town Council and other local government bodies. The C.P.P., which had dominated urban politics and the urban pork barrel since late 1950, was squeezed out, mainly by terrorist tactics, and was replaced by pro-N.L.M. members in 1955 and early 1956. Similarly, in the case of many rural local authorities, membership on such bodies became "too hot" for C.P.P. members, who resigned in fairly large numbers. During 1955, then, resources were allocated by N.L.M. supporters in much of Ashanti well before the 1956 election, just as resources had been reallocated to C.P.P. contractors after 1950. Thus, just like the C.P.P. before the 1951 election, the N.L.M. "delivered" at least some of the "goods" before the electoral success of 1956.

CONTINUING C.P.P. DOMINANCE

The relevance of this account to the 1969 election is twofold. In the first place, despite the subsequent transition to independence and the so-called socialism of Nkrumah's Ghana, the structure of the sector of the economy under discussion remained largely intact. What is remarkable is the very long, untrammelled run that many businessmen enjoyed.¹⁵ Although the lower reaches of the economy underwent some expansion, and the govern-

(Continued on page 175)

Richard Rathbone is the author of a number of articles on Ghanaian politics. Until recently, he was coeditor of *African Affairs*, the journal of the Royal African Society, London.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

PORtUGUESE AFRICA: A HANDBOOK. EDITED BY DAVID M. ABSHIRE AND MICHAEL A. SAMUELS. (New York: Praeger, 1969. 464 pages, bibliography and index, \$15.00.)

This book's 20 chapters by seven contributors present materials on the history, economy, sociology, politics and international relations of an area larger than Western Europe. The handbook belongs on the reference shelf of students of Africa, revolution, race relations and international affairs generally, regardless of their views. Of particular interest are the sections on Portuguese education policy, economic development and Portugal's cultural heritage. An analysis of international relations away from the thrust of current United Nations and public discourse is useful.

Most of the material examines Portuguese policy, since the territories are still under metropolitan control. It reviews the two Portuguese traditions with regard to colonial rule, juxtaposing "liberals" intent on religious conversion with "conservatives" concerned with economic gain. It underlines the lack of official discrimination, despite the existence of racial prejudice, in contrast to Rhodesia and South Africa. Portugal's course as depicted here may be likened to that of France in 1944; it could be described as "cultural, economic, and administrative development, yes—political separatism, no." The authors suggest that the policy most likely to succeed is the gradual devolution of political authority. More specifically, change should result from domestic pressures inside Portugal; it could result from a realization of the magnitude of the "defense" burden at the expense of developing the country's economy, a general announcement of political devolution without timetable, and toning

down international vituperation. These steps would weaken Portugal's resolve to resist change by violent means, remove perceptions of external aggression, soften Portuguese nationalism, help prevent possible Angolan and Mozambiquan U.D.I. à la *Rhodésienne*, and avoid a power vacuum that could easily be filled by South Africa and Rhodesia.

W. A. E. Skurnik
University of Colorado

AFRICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY: BASIC ISSUES AND PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. EDITED BY IRVING LEONARD MARKOVITZ. (New York: Free Press, 1970. 458 pages, bibliography and index, \$8.95.)

This is a collection of 29 essays and documents culled from 15 journals, 4 books, and 3 government sources; 10 of the writers are African; 6 of the sources are French-language.

The editor's basic assumption is stated clearly: that the "most legitimate" socio-political orders are those which "encourage the political participation of the vast majority . . . and maximize the distribution of any fruits of economic development." Thus his ideal system would be a kind of guided participatory democracy, because only that could lead to economic justice. The thesis is controversial if only because it is incomplete. Presumably, it also leads to debatable generalizations. The editor suggests that after political independence, systemic legitimacy was accepted and opposition groups differed with governments only on specifics. He declares that there is great danger in allowing apolitical or anti-political bureaucrats to persist in the illusion that they can be effective in bringing about political—to say nothing of economic—development.

The book is divided into seven parts.

The first discusses the Africans' pre-colonial greatness and imperialism; the second, the struggle for independence with emphasis on tribal ties; the third emphasizes pre-independence nationalism. Part IV presents views on how to consolidate power; Part V explores linkages between the growth of bureaucracy and economy; Part VI focuses on the "politics of race" (in South Africa and Rhodesia); and the final part addresses itself to nonalignment and Pan-Africanism. Many of the selections are not easily available in this country.

W. A. E. S.

GOVERNING IN BLACK AFRICA: PERSPECTIVES ON NEW STATES. EDITED BY MARION E. DORO AND NEWELL M. STULTZ. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1970. 351 pages, bibliography, \$7.95.)

This collection of essays is one of the finest available. The editors demonstrate a thorough and analytic grasp of the subject matter and available literature, and the book is welcome because a paperbound edition is accessible to students as a text. The essays concentrate on sub-Saharan Africa without South Africa and the extant dependencies. The focus is on post-independence political development as well as on methodological advances in the social sciences. Twenty-four authors are represented in 25 essays, and the two selections on aspects of military involvement reflect a growing understanding of that phenomenon.

The book is divided into six units. The first centers on determinants of behavior, and includes articles on ethnicity, the monarchical persuasion, Christianity and nationalism (but not "expectations"). Unit two presents mobilization units, focusing on charisma, trade unions and parties. Unit three covers government structures, including constitutions, legislatures, decision-making and the military. Unit four, national integration, highlights that subject through pieces on integration patterns, elites, federalism and the military. Unit five, on development, has five articles which

cut across social, economic and political development by focusing on concepts and theory, on traditional leadership and on representation. The final unit deals with international affairs and presents material on colonialism, pan-Africanism, systems analysis and non-alignment.

W. A. E. S.

ETHIOPIA: THE MODERNIZATION OF AUTOCRACY. By ROBERT L. HESS. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970. 248 pages, bibliography and index, \$8.95.)

Occasionally a scholar still writes a book combining a labor of love with a good grasp of the subject matter; this is such a book, presented in readable narrative style. The 11 chapters range in coverage from an introductory description, through a review of the long history of this unusual nation (a political entity since the Roman Empire) and its achievements and problems, to speculations about the future.

What are the major obstacles and dangers to national unity? Professor Hess suggests that they include regionalism, most potent in Eritrea but not confined to the seacoast; the transitional nature of the "political" system which rests on personalities and factions, the central government structure and bureaucracy and the Emperor, symbolic of unity and continuity; modern education; and a host of other factors like Amhara-Tigrean antipathy, Arab involvement, conflict with Muslim border tribes, and general resistance to the centralized government inaugurated by Haile Selassie since he acceded to the throne in 1930.

In international relations, Ethiopia has followed her national interests—and has counted on United States help in a pinch, though it may not be forthcoming as readily after recent public revelations about the degree of United States involvement. Finally, Dr. Hess believes that the monarchy will survive only with the support of the armed forces, which are likely to maintain it as a tool of national integration.

W. A. E. S.

NIGERIAN POLITICS AND MILITARY RULE: PRELUDE TO THE CIVIL WAR. EDITED BY S. K. PANTER-BRICK. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 276 pages, \$9.00.)

This is a competent and perceptive study written by 7 close observers of the Nigerian scene. Of the 7 substantive chapters (138 pages), the first, by P. C. Lloyd, traces the origins of the crisis in conflicts among the country's major ethnic groups, aggravated by the nationalist movement toward independence. The editor finds that military intervention in January, 1966, was not the end, but the beginning, of the worst crisis in Nigeria's history. He uses the dialectic to explain events: thesis was the early centralization; antithesis, the decentralization following July, 1966; and the synthesis has yet to come.

The reader is left to wonder whether Ironsi could have prevented disintegration had he (or someone else) been more politically astute. Chapters 3 and 4 take a closer look at the military; Luckham examines structural weaknesses and the causes of disorganization within the officer corps and finds that the societal environment affected and magnified not only regional and ethnic cleavages, but also political and organizational defects—like rapid Africanization in relation to discipline. Dent focuses on military attitudes toward the political process. Not surprisingly, he confirms that professional “deformation” and antipathies toward politicians prevented the military from perceiving politics as a function which need be performed; by the time they learned, it was too late to avert catastrophe. In chapter 5, Dudley notes that Nigeria's problems result largely from the absence of legitimate, institutionalized methods to bridge tensions among partners in federation. He questions whether the West will be able to survive further fragmentation. Six appendices cover select speeches and documents that complement the essays, which tend toward narrative reconstruction and to lack conceptualization in the eyes of many Americans. (Surely

the day is near when British printers will make concessions to readers' eyes.)

W. A. E. S.

PROTEST AND POWER IN BLACK AFRICA. EDITED BY ROBERT I. ROTBERG AND ALI A. MAZRUI. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 1195 pages, bibliography, index, \$25.00.)

This is an impressive collection of essays on a vastly important topic. The list of authors of the 37 chapters (three African, 19 American, and 11 European) reads like a partial “Who's Who of Africanists.” Organized into seven parts, the chapters address themselves to events from the nineteenth century to the recent military coups in independent African states and, in another dimension, to religious, economic, literary, and political samples of protest.

In his Introduction, Dr. Rotberg distinguishes between *resistance* to “external hegemony . . . prior to the time when an alien power has imposed . . . a new administrative framework,” and *rebellion*, the “militant expression at the later stage”; or, in other terms, “resisters rejected what they anticipated,” whereas “rebels . . . rejected what they knew.” Adaptation generally followed World War I, accompanied by hope for gradual improvement from inferior to equal status. At the same time, new skills were acquired, particularly intellectual skills, which proved essential in managing the subsequent rise of general frustrations. In his conclusion, Dr. Mazrui suggests a typology of protest, from “conservation” through “restoration” and “transformation” to “corrective censure.” Although some of his discussion implies linear progression, he points out that either form can be found in the past or present. With the help of a symbolic analogy taken from a Kenyan legend reminiscent of Aesop's or La Fontaine's fable about an oak tree and a reed, he argues that protest may be more useful if it does not challenge the entire system of a society. In a com-

(Continued on page 175)

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The State of the Union Message, 1971

On January 22, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon delivered a State of the Union Message to a joint session of the 92d Congress. Excerpts follow:

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, my colleagues in the Congress, our distinguished guests and my fellow Americans.

This 92d Congress has a chance to be recorded as the greatest Congress in America's history.

In these troubled years just past, America has been going through a long nightmare of war and division, of crime and inflation. Even more deeply, we have gone through a long, dark night of the American spirit. But now that night is ending. Now we must let our spirits soar again. Now we are ready for the lift of a driving dream.

The people of this nation are eager to get on with the quest for new greatness. They see challenges, and they are prepared to meet those challenges. It is for us here to open the doors that will set free again the real greatness of this nation—the genius of the American people.

How shall we meet this challenge? How can we truly open the doors, and set free the full genius of our people?

The way in which the 92d Congress answers these questions will determine its place in history. More importantly, it can determine this nation's place in history as we enter the third century of our independence.

Tonight, I shall present to the Congress six great goals. I shall ask not simply for more new programs in the old framework, but to change the framework itself—to reform the entire structure of American government so we can make it again fully responsive to the needs and the wishes of the American people. . . .

In discussing these great goals, I am dealing tonight only with matters on the domestic side of the nation's agenda. I shall make a separate report to the Congress and the nation next month on developments in our foreign policy.

The first of these six great goals is already before the Congress.

I urge that the unfinished business of the 91st Congress be made the first priority of the 92d.

Over the next two weeks, I will call upon Congress to take action on more than 35 pieces of proposed legislation on which action was not completed last year.

The most important is welfare reform.

The present welfare system has become a monstrous, consuming outrage—an outrage against the community, against the taxpayer, and particularly against the children it is supposed to help.

We may honestly disagree on what to do about it. But we can all agree that we must meet the challenge not by pouring more money into the old system, but by abolishing it and adopting a new one.

Let us place a floor under the income of every family with children in America—and without those demeaning, soul-stifling affronts to human dignity that so blight the lives of welfare children today. But let us also establish an effective work incentive and an effective work requirement.

Let us provide the means by which more can help themselves. Let us generously help those who are not able to help themselves. But let us stop helping those who are able to help themselves but refuse to do so.

The second great goal is to achieve what Americans have not enjoyed since 1957—full prosperity in peacetime.

The tide of inflation has turned. The rise in the cost of living, which had been gathering dangerous momentum in the late sixties, was reduced last year. Inflation will be further reduced this year.

But as we have moved from runaway inflation toward reasonable price stability, and at the same time have been moving from a wartime economy to a peacetime economy, we have paid a price in increased unemployment.

We should take no comfort from the fact that the level of unemployment in this transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy is lower than in any peacetime year of the nineteen-sixties.

This is not good enough for the man who is unemployed in the seventies. We must do better for workers in peacetime and we will do better.

To achieve this, I will submit an expansionary budget this year—one that will help stimulate the economy and thereby open up new job opportunities for millions of Americans.

It will be a full-employment budget, a budget designed to be in balance if the economy were operating at its peak potential. By spending as if we were at full employment, we will help to bring about full employment.

I ask the Congress to accept these expansionary policies—to accept the concept of the full-employment budget.

At the same time, I ask the Congress to cooperate in resisting expenditures that go beyond the limits of the full-employment budget. For as we wage a campaign to bring about a widely shared prosperity, we must not re-ignite the fires of inflation and so undermine that prosperity.

With the stimulus and the discipline of a full-employment budget; with the commitment of the independent Federal Reserve System to provide fully for the monetary needs of a growing economy; and with a much greater effort by labor and management to make their wage and price decisions in the light of the national interest and their own long-run best interests—then for the worker, the farmer, the consumer, and for Americans everywhere we shall gain the goal of a new prosperity: more jobs, more income and more profits, without inflation and without war.

This is a great goal, and one that we can achieve together.

The third great goal is to continue the effort so dramatically begun this past year: to restore and enhance our natural environment.

Building on the foundation laid in the 37-point program I submitted to Congress last year, I will propose a strong new set of initiatives to clean up our air and water, to combat noise, and to preserve and restore our surroundings.

I will propose programs to make better use of our land, and to encourage a balanced national growth—growth that will revitalize our rural heartland and enhance the quality of life throughout America.

And not only to meet today's needs but to anticipate those of tomorrow, I will put forward the most extensive program ever proposed by a President to expand the nation's parks, recreation areas and open spaces in a way that truly brings parks to the people. For only if we have a legacy of parks will the next generation have parks to enjoy.

As a fourth great goal, I will offer a far-reaching set of proposals for improving America's health care and making it available more fairly to more people.

I will propose:

¶A program to insure that no American family will be prevented from obtaining basic medical care by inability to pay.

¶A major increase in and redirection of aid to medical schools, to greatly increase the number of doctors and other health personnel.

¶Incentives to improve the delivery of health services, to get more medical care resources into those areas that have not been adequately served, to make greater use of medical assistants and to slow the alarming rise in the costs of medical care.

¶New programs to encourage better preventive

medicine, by attacking the causes of disease and injury, and by providing incentives to doctors to keep people well rather than just to treat them when they are sick.

I will also ask appropriation of an extra \$100-million to launch an intensive campaign to find a cure for cancer, and I will ask later for whatever additional funds can effectively be used. . . .

America has long been the wealthiest nation in the world. Now it is time we became the healthiest nation in the world.

The fifth great goal is to strengthen and renew our state and local governments.

As we approach our 200th anniversary in 1976, we remember that this nation launched itself as a loose confederation of separate states, without a workable central government. At that time, the mark of its leaders' vision was that they quickly saw the need to balance the separate powers of the states with a government of central powers.

And so they gave us a Constitution of balanced powers, of unity with diversity—and so clear was their vision that it survives as the oldest written Constitution still in force in the world today.

For almost two centuries since—and dramatically in the nineteen-thirties—at those great turning points when the question has been between the states and the federal government, it has been resolved in favor of a stronger central government.

During this time the nation grew and prospered. But one thing history tells us is that no great movement goes in the same direction forever. Nations change, they adapt, or they slowly die.

The time has come to reverse the flow of power and resources from the states and communities to Washington, and start power and resources flowing back from Washington to the states and communities and, more important, to the people, all across America.

The time has come for a new partnership between the federal government and the states and localities—a partnership in which we entrust the states and localities with a larger share of the nation's responsibilities, and in which we share our revenues with them so they can meet those responsibilities.

To achieve this goal, I propose to the Congress tonight that we enact a plan of revenue sharing, historic in scope and bold in concept.

All across America today, states and cities are confronted with a financial crisis. . . . Most are caught between the prospects of bankruptcy, on the one hand, and adding to an already crushing tax burden, on the other. . . .

Now the time has come to take a new direction, and once again to introduce a new and more creative balance in our approach to government. . . .

I propose that the Congress make a \$16-billion investment in renewing state and local government—with \$5 billion of this in new and unrestricted

funds, to be used as the states and localities see fit, and with the other \$11 billion provided by allocating \$1 billion of new funds and converting one-third of the money going to the present narrow-purpose aid programs into federal revenue-sharing funds for six broad purposes—urban development, rural development, education, transportation, job training, and law enforcement—but with the states and localities making their own local decisions on how it should be spent.

For the next fiscal year, this would increase total federal aid to the states and localities by more than 25 per cent over the present level.

The revenue-sharing proposals I send to the Congress will include the safeguards against discrimination that accompany all other federal funds allocated to the states. Neither the President nor the Congress nor the conscience of the nation can permit money which comes from all the people to be used in a way which discriminates against some of the people.

The federal government will still have a large and vital role to play in achieving our national purposes. Established functions that are clearly and essentially federal in nature will still be performed by the federal government. New functions that need to be sponsored or performed by the federal government—such as those I have urged tonight in welfare and health—will be added to the federal agenda. Whenever it makes the best sense for us to act as a whole nation, the federal government will lead the way. But where state or local governments can better do what needs to be done, let us see that they have the resources to do it.

Under this plan the federal government will provide the states and localities with more money and less interference—and by cutting down the interference the same amount of money will go a lot further.

Let us share our resources:

To rescue the states and localities from the brink of financial crisis.

And to give homeowners and wage earners a chance to escape from ever-higher property taxes and sales taxes.

Let us share our resources for two other reasons as well. . . .

Let's face it. Most Americans today are simply fed up with government at all levels. They will not—and should not—continue to tolerate the gap between promise and performance. . . .

If we put more power in more places, we can make government more creative in more places. For that way we multiply the number of people with the ability to make things happen—and we can open the way to a new burst of creative energy throughout America.

The final reason I urge this historic shift is much more personal, for each and every one of us.

As everything seems to have grown bigger, and

more complex; as the forces that shape our lives seem to have grown more distant and more impersonal, a great feeling of frustration has crept across the land.

Whether it is the workingman who feels neglected, the black man who feels oppressed or the mother concerned about her children, there has been a growing feeling that "things are in the saddle, and ride mankind."

Millions of frustrated young Americans today are crying out—asking not what will government do for me, but what can I do, how can I contribute, how can I matter?

Let us answer them. To them and to all Americans, let us say: "We hear you and will give you a chance. We are going to give you a new chance to have more to say about the decisions that affect your future—to participate in government—because we are going to provide more centers of power where what you do can make a difference that you can see and feel in your own life and the life of your whole community."

The further away government is from people, the stronger government becomes and the weaker people become. And a nation with a strong government and a weak people is an empty shell. . . .

The idea that a bureaucratic elite in Washington knows best what is best for people everywhere and that you cannot trust local government is really a contention that you cannot trust people to govern themselves. This notion is completely foreign to the American experience. Local government is the government closest to the people and more responsive to the individual person; it is people's government in a far more intimate way than the government in Washington can ever be.

I have faith in people. I trust the judgment of people. Let us give the people a chance, a bigger voice in deciding for themselves those questions that so greatly affect their lives.

The sixth great goal is a complete reform of the federal government itself.

Based on a long and intensive study with the aid of the best advice obtainable, I have concluded that a sweeping reorganization of the executive branch is needed if the government is to keep up with the times and with the needs of the people.

I propose that we reduce the present 12 Cabinet departments to eight. I propose that the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense and Justice remain, but that all the other departments be consolidated into four: human resources, community development, natural resources, and economic development.

Let us look at what these would be:

First, a department dealing with the concerns of people—as individuals, as members of a family—a department focused on human needs.

Second, a department concerned with the community—rural communities and urban—and with

all that it takes to make a community function as a community.

Third, a department concerned with our physical environment, and with the preservation and balanced use of those great natural resources on which our nation depends.

And, fourth, a department concerned with our prosperity—with our jobs, our businesses, and those many activities that keep our economy running smoothly and well. . . .

With these four departments, when we have a problem we will know where to go—and the department will have the authority and the resources to do something about it.

Over the years we have added departments and created agencies, each to serve a new constituency or to handle a particular task—and these have grown and multiplied in what has become a hopeless confusion of form and function.

The time has come to match our structure to our purposes—to look with a fresh eye, and to organize the government by conscious, comprehensive design to meet the new needs of a new era.

One hundred years ago, Abraham Lincoln stood on a battlefield and spoke of a government of the people, by the people and for the people. Too often since then, we have become a nation of the government, by the government, and for the government.

By enacting these reforms, we can renew that principle that Lincoln stated so simply and so well.

By giving everyone's voice a chance to be heard, we will have government that truly is of the people.

By creating more centers of meaningful power, more places where decisions that really count can be made, by giving more people a chance to do something, we can have government that truly is by the people.

And by setting up a completely modern, functional system of government at the national level, we in Washington will at last be able to provide government that truly is for the people.

I realize that what I am asking is that not only the executive branch in Washington but even this Congress will have to change by giving up some of its power.

Giving up power is hard. But I would urge all of you, as leaders of this country, to remember that the truly revered leaders in world history are those who gave power to the people, not those who took it away.

As we consider these reforms we will be acting, not for the next two years or the next 10 years, but for the next hundred years.

So let us approach these six great goals with a sense, not only of the moment in history, but also of history itself.

Let us act with the willingness to work together and the vision and the boldness and the courage of those great Americans who met in Philadelphia almost 190 years ago to create a Constitution.

Let us leave a heritage as they did—not just for our children but for millions yet unborn—of a nation where every American will have a chance not only to live in peace and to enjoy prosperity and opportunity, but to participate in a system of government where he knows not only his votes but his ideas count—a system of government which will provide the means for America to reach heights of achievement undreamed of before.

Those men who met in Philadelphia left a great heritage because they had a vision—not only of what the nation was, but of what it could become.

As I think of that vision, I recall that America was founded as the land of the open door—as a haven for the oppressed, a land of opportunity, a place of refuge and of hope. . . .

For the black American, the Indian, the Mexican-American, and for those others in our land who have not had an equal chance, the nation at last has begun to confront the need to press open the door of full and equal opportunity, and of human dignity.

For all Americans, with these changes I have proposed tonight, we can open the door to a new era of opportunity. . . .

In the next few weeks I will spell out in greater detail the way I propose that we achieve these six great goals. I ask this Congress to be responsive. If it is, then the 92d Congress, at the end of its term, will be able to look back on a record more splendid than any in our history.

This can be the Congress that helped us end the longest war in the nation's history, and end it in a way that will give us at last a genuine chance for a full generation of peace.

This can be the Congress that helped achieve an expanding economy, with full employment and without inflation—and without the deadly stimulus of war.

This can be the Congress that reformed a welfare system that has robbed recipients of their dignity while it robbed states and cities of their resources.

This can be the Congress that pressed forward the rescue of our environment, and established for the next generation an enduring legacy of parks for the people.

This can be the Congress that launched a new era in American medicine, in which the quality of medical care was enhanced while the costs were made less burdensome.

But above all, what this Congress can be remembered for is opening the way to a new American revolution—a peaceful revolution in which power was turned back to the people—in which government at all levels was refreshed and renewed, and made truly responsive. . . .

My colleagues in the Congress—these are great goals, and they can make the sessions of this Congress a great moment for America. . . .

POLITICS AND FACTIONALISM IN GHANA

(Continued from page 167)

ment interceded in some sectors, the domination of C.P.P. businessmen in small service industries, small contracting, building, and so forth, was almost unchanged up to the coup of 1966. Laundry-owners, brick-makers, suppliers of schoolbooks, lorry owners, taxi-fleet operators, and so on retained a firm grip on their positions and had undoubtedly used politics to further their careers. Many of them became involved in state enterprises, and many of those who controlled the activities of the many government corporations came from the earliest stratum of pro-C.P.P. small entrepreneurs. This conclusion considerably modifies the concept of a workers' party and, hopefully, discredits the simplistic view that the opposition was middle class and the C.P.P. was proletarian in support. Yet it goes further.

After 1957, when Ghana gained her independence, the C.P.P. held the upper hand in economic affairs. The N.L.M.'s local successes were reversed politically and most entrepreneurs skillfully realized that discreet turn-coating was in order. Thus in much of Ghana after 1951 and in all of Ghana after about 1958, entry into most levels of the economy was controlled by the C.P.P. and its supporters. Until 1966, both the old entrepreneurs of the U.G.C.C. type and new entrepreneurs were effectively excluded at the government's discretion. Thus by 1966 a large group of frustrated businessmen once again were being excluded from full participation in the economy, and they actively supported any change that might open the economy to them. For economic reasons, they certainly supported the 1966 coup d'état.

In the subsequent three-year period while politics was officially banned in Ghana, these businessmen had ample opportunity to assess the probable outcome of a future election. Busia was clearly supported by at least some elements in the ruling National Liberation Council. More significantly, the very great

obstructions placed in the way of the old C.P.P. for much of this three years removed many active businessmen from positions of power and replaced them with those who had been "knocking on the door." Many state organizations "went public" and were thus opened to new groups.

Well before the August, 1969, elections, then, significant changes were apparent in the economic picture. Those who held positions once dominated by the C.P.P. had a strong commitment to the status quo and this in turn was best served by voting for Busia's status quo party. Thus in a sense Busia's victory was something of a counter-revolution but not a counter-revolution in its usual sense. Much of Ghanaian national politics is inter-elite competition for controllable sectors of public and private life. In this competition, it is not class division but divisions within a class that largely determine allegiance. Despite apparently major changes, the substance of politics in Ghana is unlikely to alter greatly.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 170)

ment about which at least some African leaders might well reflect, he writes that "the institutionalization of protest . . . is one of the central features of political development and social integration."

W. A. E. S.

FOUR AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS.

By CHRISTIAN P. POTTHOLM. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970). 296 pages and index, \$8.95.)

Professor Potholm has written an outstanding book which goes a long way toward introducing students to an understanding of politics and developing areas in Africa. He uses a basic systems approach, defining a political system as a "demand - processing, image - projecting, goal-seeking entity, embedded in an international environment." Thus he assumes that a well defined, national political system does exist and legitimately seeks to main-

(Continued on page 180)

THE UNITED STATES ROLE

(Continued from page 135)

ing toward black Americans for tactical lessons, and are slowly becoming conscious of their rights in urban and university circles. It can be argued that, at least in the short run, greater pressures by South Africa's blacks and coloureds will be met with more repression. In the long run, however, it is also likely that repression will reach a point of no return and become dysfunctional for the adherents of present policies.

There is a large area of uncertainty in this kind of prognosis. It is impossible to predict the effect of confident nationalist freedom fighters trained in adjacent and nearby states. What would 10,000 or 20,000 guerrillas armed with modern weapons and schooled in effective tactics accomplish by the end of 1975 or 1980? How much help would they get from indigenous populations, given the capabilities of incumbent regimes? If observers are convinced today that they do not know the real mood and capabilities of black majorities, then how could the dominant governments in southern Africa effectively meet a major challenge from black majorities in the years to come? There is uncertainty also about the future of economic cooperation between South Africa and other African states. The Republic views itself as playing a significant role in Africa's economic growth and is making appropriate overtures to the black African states. Responses have been mixed, but are greater than was anticipated. Leaving aside mounting trade between Africa and the Republic, an Ivoirien call for a dialogue found favorable echoes in Dahomey, Gabon, Ghana and Nigeria; and Madagascar accepted a \$3.2 million loan from Pretoria if only to reduce the island's dependence on France.

There is not much evidence to suggest that Africa is becoming an area for important competition between superpowers. With some exceptions, Africa's importance is declining in the eyes of the "outside" world. United States policy in Africa consists for the

most part of opening trade and investment channels, supplementing external development aid, supporting United Nations and African decolonization objectives, and protecting minor United States strategic interests.

There is no conflict between the redefinition of United States domestic priorities and the direct United States national interest in continuing to contribute to Africa's development needs. Such a contribution is essential for several reasons. First, the United States will probably need greater access to raw materials in the future. Second, foreign assistance is in many ways a subsidy to the United States economy; millions of Americans derive their livelihood from aid-related activities. Third, the best guarantee for Africa's independence is the nationalistic pride which characterized this nation in earlier days. Those worried about the "inroads" of communism should look at Guinean President Sékou Touré's ouster of a Soviet diplomat or listen to the chuckles greeting Sino-Soviet competition. Fourth, the role of a world power requires that it show an active interest in the aspirations of other parts of the world. The time has surely passed when a United States President could commit this nation to "bear any burden, pay any price" in pursuing international goals. The fact remains that the United States is one of the world's giants, and that the responsibility that goes with power can be eschewed only at great risk. And finally, the United States has a great tradition of humanitarianism without which the image and effectiveness of the United States would be blurred.

For Africa, political independence is all but achieved. Hence her chief preoccupation is shifting toward economic independence (meaning the short-term benefits of protectionism) and, simultaneously, aiming at longer-run economic diversification. New African elites are likely to reevaluate their national interests in terms of economic rewards and to move in the direction of greater inter-African and more selective extra-African cooperation. To this process the United States can and should make a significant contribution.

POPULATION PRESSURE IN TROPICAL AFRICA

(Continued from page 141)

planning. In addition, many of these women already have received specific information about contraception and are anxious to avoid pregnancy. This seems to suggest a considerable potential for family planning, but, in fact, only a small percentage of the women in any sample studied have ever practiced birth control.

Clearly the impact of traditional anti-natal practices and modern contraception on the overall level of fertility in tropical Africa is negligible. Reflecting this, John Caldwell concludes that "traditional methods [may] keep the birth rate a little below what it would otherwise have been," but that the impact "is probably less than that of venereal disease." Similarly, he believes that "modern contraceptives [may] have reduced [the area birth rate by] a fraction of a point."¹¹

Finally, while contraceptive use will certainly increase with modernization, the probable effect of this increase on the crude birth rate is likely to be limited because the elimination of cultural and biological constraints on fertility will probably more than compensate for the voluntary reduction of family size by relatively small privileged groups in the community. This process is likely to maintain the birth rate at roughly its present level for at least the next 10 to 20 years.

CONCLUSION

High fertility in tropical Africa was and is a reflection of traditional cultural values which continue to exercise a dominant influence in the lives of most Africans. For the vast majority of the population, the effect of modernization has been very slight. By initially altering the circumstances of men's lives rather than the values they live by, modernization may even tend on balance to free rather than limit the procreative ten-

¹¹ John C. Caldwell, "Anti-Natal Practice in Tropical Africa," paper presented at the I.U.S.S.P. meeting, London, 1969, p. 5. See also his article, "The Control of Family Size in Tropical Africa," *Demography*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1968), pp. 598-619.

dencies of the larger community. Conversely, for certain individuals in certain limited circumstances, the value transformation may be complete; but for the moment, and for the foreseeable future, the reproductive behavior of this modern elite will be lost in the mainstream of traditional fertility.

Meanwhile, modern medicine and public health have substantially reduced the African death rate. And with modest improvements in the standard of living, further reductions in mortality must be anticipated.

With declining mortality and constant fertility, the population of tropical Africa will increase rapidly in the years ahead. This increase will intensify the already very serious problem of population pressure, while enormously complicating the overall process of economic development. Indeed, should the population growth rate increase to 3 per cent or more a year, most development efforts would be neutralized and, under the resulting conditions of general frustration and disappointment, it is problematic whether a stable political order could be maintained.

Lastly, if we assume that further declines in mortality are both desirable and inevitable, only a rapid reduction in fertility will change the previous growth equation and alter its implications. This, in turn, will require vigorous national action to develop and expand the substantial family planning potential which is already present. Unfortunately, however, most tropical African governments are not very enthusiastic about population control or family planning at the present time.

FRANCOPHONE AFRICA

(Continued from page 145)

in elections on December 20, 1970—four years after the implantation of military rule—for 57 National Assembly seats. The African Democratic Rally, the leading political formation (there are seven parties), is in process of forming a "government of national union," but General Sangoulé Lamizana will continue in office as President, and other army representatives will hold one-third of

the Cabinet portfolios during the four-year transition period called for under the June, 1970, constitution.

In short, there is a growing recognition by civilian and military leaders that the legitimacy and longevity of governments cannot rest on coercion alone. This suggests that military interventionism should not be regarded as a new manifestation of praetorianism. What is involved in most instances has been the assumption of a mediatory role by the military when established governments have alienated their constituencies or have demonstrated a growing incapacity effectively to manage the affairs of state.

FRENCH ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

One of the main strands in the tapestry of African relations with France is economic. France gave on the average almost \$300 million in bilateral assistance to the African-Malagasy states below the Sahara in the 1960-1964 period. The figure for loans and grants approximated \$260 million for the subsequent six-year period. In addition, private assistance has been averaging in excess of \$65 million per year over the past decade.

These magnitudes are only a part of the aid picture. In addition, funds and technical support are funneled through a number of international organizations such as the Development Assistance Committee (D.A.C.) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

While it is frequently charged that the ties with France are a form of monetary tutelage, the evidence suggests that French largesse is intended primarily to support relationships that are mutually beneficial from an economic standpoint. French investment firms, trading corporations and banks benefit substantially from this relationship, as do industrial and mining groups. Moreover, from the African perspective, French support has led to spin-off advantages for the African states—e.g., over 80 per cent of Common Market aid is going to francophone states with close ties to Paris.

A balanced assessment, then, would conclude that France's economic support con-

stitutes a major element in the calculus of nation-building in Africa. At minimum, French subventions permit governments to function without the constant prospect of receivership; at optimum, French aid ensures the climate necessary to spur economic development and social progress.

THE FUTURE OF AFRICA SOUTH

(Continued from page 150)

Africans. How many would die would depend on a number of complex factors, but it should be pointed out that to the best of my knowledge, there have been no projections made for the total number of casualties based on any of several possible levels of force application.¹⁰ Even more important, activists, scholars and government officials have shied away from even the consideration of such projections.

In the light of this avoidance, a fundamental question must be asked. Is the violent liberation of southern Africa worth the price of 50,000 dead? A million? Five million? Surely these are important, even vital, questions, which must be answered, not in Lagos or London or Brunswick, Maine, for that matter, but within the context of southern Africa, by those groups who can be expected to pay the bulk of the costs.

It is possible that the European regimes would capitulate rather quickly and bloodlessly if they thought they were facing an overwhelmingly powerful coalition. At the same time, there could be long, increasingly bloody civil war, with its concomitant costs in civilian dead. Thus it seems imperative that those favoring a violent alteration of the *status quo* should carefully analyze the relative costs of a variety of liberation strategies.

On balance, if one scans the present in

¹⁰ For some conservative estimates of the casualties projected for an invading force, see Amelia C. Leiss (ed.), *Apartheid and United Nations Collective Measures* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965), pp. 131-153. The intervening five years have been accompanied by substantial increases in the regulative and security capabilities of both the Rhodesian and the South African governments.

search of the future of Africa South, the following conclusions emerge. Over the short term, the present patterns of European domination will continue, but over the intermediate term, the subsystem may be reduced in scope (although it could conceivably expand) without any fundamental alteration of the remaining portions of the system. Over the longer term, however, without substantial Great Power intervention, it seems unlikely that European control of southern Africa will be terminated. There is currently no evidence that the African forces bent on the alteration of the *status quo* are gaining strength at a rate sufficiently meaningful to challenge, let alone overcome, the present military and economic strength of the European regimes.

Thus it would appear that while such factors as African determination to reduce the areas of European control, increasing support for liberation forces and Portugal's continued willingness to pay the price of maintaining her colonial empire will affect the number of units under European control, only Great Power intervention can eliminate European domination of southern Africa, particularly of South Africa. Moreover, such Great Power intervention, while likely to be successful in terms of regime alteration, is also likely to result in substantial, perhaps even catastrophic, casualties among the civilians in Africa South. These are sobering, even depressing, conclusions, but they seem as realistic to this observer as they are unpleasant to those who favor the alteration of the *status quo* in southern Africa.

THE ETHIOPIAN PERPLEX

(Continued from page 156)

disparate land together, despite slow progress, a backward-looking nobility and a tradition-entrenched Church.

The disposition of political power will become a question only with the Emperor's death. The constitution provides for passage of control to his son, but Asfa Wossen's abilities are doubtful. He incurred his

father's wrath when he relinquished the government to the rebels in 1960. Since then, he has been given only ceremonial functions and has lived in his father's shadow. Urban Ethiopians are well aware of his ineffectual role, while rural Ethiopians expect the usual struggle for accession. Political parties do not exist; so there is no structure through which a peaceful power exchange could be effected.

Haile Selassie is 78 years old and cannot be expected to live much longer. When he dies an enormous political vacuum will develop, a situation ripe for foreign meddling. Some observers fear a Vietnam-like future for Ethiopia, with a wild confusion of political forces vying for control. Others fear active Soviet intervention through the E.L.F. organization. Others foresee United States support for the Crown Prince through the American base in Eritrea. Yet again, there is talk of a great Galla uprising against the north.

If Haile Selassie abdicated in favor of his son, his personal power and magnetism might well be strong enough to guarantee that the empire would survive the pressures of change. It is not, however, in the nature of powerful kings to give up their royal thrones. Thus Ethiopia's future remains a puzzle.

THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA

(Continued from page 163)

organized labor. Whether such an alliance can hold together, and whether it will prove possible to build up a basis for its support among trade unions and workers during a period of industrial unrest and tension, while the leaders continue as members of the federal Cabinet, will be a keen test of the skill of Aminu Kano and his allies. Their attempts would also seem to depend on whether the balance of opinion continues to favor the prediction that the military will be able to carry through its intended plans. Without such confidence, a scramble could develop as politicians seek to build up constituencies on the most readily available basis which, for the present in much of the country, would mean a basis in local particularism.

The military rulers have set their sights high by aiming to continue in power for more than five more years during which they plan to conduct effective government and solve many of Nigeria's more acute political problems. What the governments most fear is a spread of the localized but viciously destructive outbursts such as those of the Agbekoya in Western Nigeria in 1968-1969, and any extension of a spirit of non-cooperation and refusal to respect constituted government. In the absence of political party activity, and in a country where the mass communications media remain relatively undeveloped and government administrators are thin on the ground, there is little way short of increasingly forceful repression to cope with discontent. As they did in the latter years of British colonial rule, mass political parties could turn disenchantment and hostility into constructive activity and provide a means for transferring authority to new rulers, but for the present the army does not permit such an approach.

For all their problems, the military governments have in the conduct of external relations a means for assisting in the solution of domestic difficulties. Nigeria is energetically building close political and economic ties with her neighbors—for example, granting economic aid to Dahomey and forming a joint Ministerial Commission with the Republic of Niger to liberalize trade and to develop other links—and these moves are calculated to bring benefits to the Nigerian economy. More significant, however, is the active stand the Nigerian government is beginning to take against colonialism and white racism. With the backing of its military power the government can be expected to follow a policy of actively opposing Portuguese colonialism—as evidenced in its speedy offer of military assistance to Guinea when Conakry was attacked from Portuguese Bissau—white minority rule in Southern Africa and European and United States economic and military aid for the Portuguese and South African regimes. It will do this both on the basis of moral conviction, and because such policies will help to unite Nigerians.

1970 saw the end of the civil war in Nigeria. To Nigerians this has not been the occasion for starting again; the prevailing approach has been that with the war ended all Nigerians can return to the proper tasks of life. For the governments of the federation the two major tasks of the year have been, first, fashioning and initiating a new national economic development plan and, second, making a start toward restoring civilian government by defining the hurdles which have to be surmounted. The tasks that the military rulers have set themselves present a decisive challenge for them, for the governmental administrators and for the people.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 175)

tain itself by seeking to balance demands by particularistic groups against those of a national interest. After reviewing "political development" and background in the "African context," the author examines the political systems of South Africa, Tanzania, Somalia and the Ivory Coast. The result is a conceptual clarity which makes important distinctions about the countries.

And yet his conclusions are far from startling. He notes that "the prevention of decay is a far more pressing problem than inducing development" (thus suggesting the limitations of using some of the capabilities as a criterion for the evaluation of performance); African leaders can at times do no more than fight a holding action to stop "political demobilization." One gets the impression that he regards widespread popular participation almost as a *bonum per se*, and that he attributes more potency to the political system than is warranted. But his thesis that more attention should be paid to political decay is not only pertinent, it is courageous, in view of the ease with which one could raise the absurd charge of intellectual neocolonialism against anyone dedicated to the quest for objectivity.

W. A. E. S.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of January, 1971, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab-Israeli Conflict

Jan. 2—U.A.R. President Anwar el-Sadat says that he will not agree to an extension of the cease-fire when it expires February 5 if substantial progress has not been made toward a political settlement of the dispute with Israel, including a timetable for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab lands.

Jan. 3—The Israeli military government dismisses the mayor of Gaza, who was appointed by the U.A.R. prior to the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip in the 1967 war.

Jan. 4—Sadat reveals that 6 Soviet soldiers, brought to the U.A.R. to man missile sites, have been killed in an Israeli raid on Dahshur.

Israeli military spokesmen report that Arab guerrillas carried out grenade attacks on Israeli patrols in Gaza this morning.

Jan. 5—Representatives of Israel, Jordan and the U.A.R. resume indirect negotiations for peace under the auspices of Gunnar Jarring, U.N. Secretary General U Thant's special representative for the Middle East.

Jan. 8—Jarring, in Jerusalem, confers with Israeli Premier Golda Meir and Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban.

Jan. 9—Eban and Meir present the Israeli proposals for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict to Jarring.

Jan. 10—The Israeli-occupied town of Gaza is crippled by a strike for the 2d day.

Jan. 15—Mohammed H. el-Zayyat, the U.A.R. delegate to the New York peace talks, presents a document to Jarring outlining the U.A.R.'s position on the Israeli proposals.

Jan. 20—The U.A.R., criticizing Israel for what it calls deliberate leaks to the press

of the Israeli proposals, makes public the text of its reply to the proposals. The Egyptians criticize the Israeli failure to deal with the questions of Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since 1967 and of the Palestinian refugees.

Jan. 23—It is reported that in an exchange of notes between U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad, Riad refused to extend the cease-fire beyond the February 5 expiration date.

Jan. 25—The text of the Jordanian response to the Israeli proposals, presented to Jarring on January 18, is made public; the Jordanians insist on the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Arab territory.

Berlin Crisis

Jan. 13—As 4-power talks resume on the fate of divided Berlin, Western officials ask the Soviet representatives for an explanation of the harassment yesterday of allied military traffic on the autobahn linking West Berlin and West Germany.

Jan. 31—Telephone service between East and West Berlin is resumed for the first time in 19 years.

Commonwealth of Nations

Jan. 14—The opening session of a 9-day conference of delegations from the 31 member nations of the Commonwealth is held in Singapore.

Jan. 20—The heads of government of the Commonwealth nations reach an agreement which will permit Britain to supply arms aid to South Africa while a Commonwealth study group considers the matter further.

Jan. 22—At the concluding session of the conference, delegates reach an agreement

on a declaration condemning racial discrimination.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Jan. 30—After a day and a half of talks in Paris, Italian Premier Emilio Colombo and Foreign Minister Aldo Moro return to Rome; they have not reached an agreement with French leaders on plans for a supranational Europe; the French are urging a more pragmatic step-by-step approach toward European unity.

Jordanian Conflict

Jan. 9—A spokesman for the Arab guerrilla organization Al Fatah reports that fighting between commandos and the Jordanian army continues north of Amman.

Jan. 14—Arab commando leaders and the Jordanian government reach a truce agreement.

Jan. 17—In an interview published in Lebanon, George Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a Marxist group, calls for the overthrow of King Hussein of Jordan.

Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries

(See also *Iran; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 21—No progress is reported at a meeting of representatives of oil-producing countries and Western oil companies in Teheran.

Jan. 28—Officials representing Western oil companies, in meetings in Iran and Libya, agree to drop their demand for a global price agreement.

Organization of American States

Jan. 25—A meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organization of American states opens in Washington to consider means of preventing acts of terrorism.

Jan. 27—The Council of the O.A.S., in a 22-to-0 vote, with the U.S. abstaining, calls for a ministerial meeting to consider Ecuadorian charges against the U.S. in a dispute over fishing rights.

United Nations

Jan. 1—U.S. President Richard Nixon signs legislation authorizing the expenditure of up to \$20 million for the expansion and improvement of U.N. headquarters in N.Y.

Jan. 11—In separate letters to Secretary General U Thant, the U.S. and the U.K. withdraw from membership in the United Nations Colonialism Committee.

Jan. 15—The U.N. Development Program approves an aid program of \$130.9 million for projects in 96 developing countries.

Jan. 18—In a press conference, Thant announces that he will not seek a 3d term when his present term expires at the end of 1971.

Jan. 19—At a meeting of the Joint Committee on Host Country Relations, the Soviet delegation charges the U.S. with "connivance" with the Jewish Defense League in the harassment of Soviet officials and their families in the U.S.

Jan. 20—The government of Finland proposes Max Jakobson, the Finnish delegate to the U.N., as a candidate to succeed U Thant as Secretary General.

War in Indochina

Jan. 1—Military spokesmen report that the New Year's truce has been marred by clashes as the U.S. begins its 2d decade of involvement in the Vietnamese war.

Jan. 3—U.S. B-52 planes raid supply routes in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. The 3-day Vietcong cease-fire ends.

Jan. 4—Military sources disclose that a Cambodian task force has started to try to outflank the Communist forces that have cut Pnompenh off from the sea since November 20, 1970.

Jan. 8—U.S. B-52's bomb targets in South Vietnam for the 4th time in 5 days.

Jan. 9—The U.S. command reports that a U.S. F-105 fighter-bomber attacked a missile site in North Vietnam yesterday after the pilot found that his plane was "locked in" on enemy radar; the F-105 had been flying escort for B-52 bombers.

Jan. 11—U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, concluding a 4-day visit to Saigon,

says gains by the South Vietnamese will make possible the withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops from Vietnam in 1971.

Jan. 12—The U.S. command reports that on January 9, in addition to the attack by the F-105 on North Vietnam, there was a "protective reaction" attack staged by a U.S. Navy A-4 jet.

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, flies to Phnompenh from Saigon to confer with U.S. and Cambodian officials on the situation in Cambodia.

Jan. 14—More than 13,000 South Vietnamese and Cambodian troops take part in a drive to open Highway 4, Phnompenh's only route to the sea.

David K. E. Bruce, the U.S. delegate to the Paris peace talks, is rebuffed by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong delegates when he tries to hand them the names of 1,534 U.S. servicemen listed by the U.S. Defense Department as missing in action in Southeast Asia.

The U.S. command reports that 27 U.S. servicemen were killed in action in Indochina last week; this is the lowest total since October 23, 1965.

Jan. 16—U.S. military spokesmen report that U.S. fighter-bombers staged "protective reaction" attacks on 3 missile sites inside North Vietnam yesterday.

Jan. 18—The U.S. Defense Department announces that the U.S. will employ the full range of U.S. air combat power in Cambodia for the protection of Americans stationed in South Vietnam.

Jan. 19—Official U.S. sources report that U.S. helicopter gunships are flying combat missions in Laos in direct support of Laotian ground troops.

The New York Times reports that 300 South Vietnamese paratroopers staged a raid on a camp inside Cambodia where 20 U.S. servicemen were believed to be held, but the prisoners were not there.

Jan. 21—The 100th session of the Paris peace talks is held; no progress is reported.

Jan. 22—Phnompenh, Cambodia, is shelled for the first time; and guerrillas, apparently

Vietcong, attack the international airport. Jan. 23—The South Vietnamese command reveals that its 5,300 troops operating in the Route 4 area of Cambodia will be withdrawn soon; yesterday the South Vietnamese and Cambodian forces succeeded in opening Route 4.

Jan. 25—According to *The New York Times*, U.S. authorities are working on a plan to send U.S. military representatives to Cambodia to check on the deployment of U.S. military equipment.

Jan. 26—The U.S. Defense Department confirms that last night between 15 and 20 "U.S. personnel," attired in civilian clothes, landed in Phnompenh to retrieve 2 damaged helicopters.

Jan. 27—Cambodian officials report the initiation of a large scale drive to clear the enemy from the area west and northwest of Phnompenh.

Jan. 29—U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers says that the U.S. might use its air power to support a South Vietnamese invasion in southern Laos.

In an intensive aerial campaign, U.S. saturation bombing raids against North Vietnamese in southern Laos continue.

Jan. 30—Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma declares that he believes the North Vietnamese are opening a general offensive against Laos.

Jan. 31—Officials in Vientiane declare that there has been no official report of an alleged South Vietnamese "incursion" into Laos, despite reports that the South Vietnamese, with U.S. air support, are preparing to mount an invasion.

U.S. B-52's bomb enemy supply bases in southern Laos on a round-the-clock basis; U.S. State and Defense Department officials continue to refuse to comment on widespread reports that a South Vietnamese invasion of Laos is under way.

The news embargo imposed by the U.S. military command in Saigon January 29, continues.

BOLIVIA

Jan. 11—Following the failure of a 7-hour

military revolt, President Juan José Torres charges that the rebel leaders sought to impose a "dictatorship of the right."

BRAZIL

Jan. 7—Military sources disclose that the government has agreed to the release of the 70 prisoners demanded by the terrorists in exchange for Giovanni Enrico Bucher, the Swiss envoy, who was kidnapped a month ago.

Jan. 16—Ambassador Bucher is released in Rio de Janeiro; the 70 political prisoners exchanged for Bucher were flown to Chile on January 14.

BURMA

Jan. 2—According to *The New York Times*, former Burmese Premier U Nu, who is leading his forces against the Burmese government of General Ne Win, has based his Burmese National Liberation Front on the Thai side of the border with Burma.

CAMBODIA

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina; Indonesia*)

Jan. 8—Because of a shortage of diesel fuel to run generators, the Cambodian government rations electricity in Phnom Penh.

CAMEROUN

Jan. 6—6 persons, including a Roman Catholic bishop, are sentenced to death by a military tribunal for their role in an alleged attempt to overthrow the government of President Ahmadou Ahidjo.

Jan. 15—3 of those sentenced to death on January 6 are executed; yesterday President Ahidjo commuted to life imprisonment the death sentences of 3 others, including the Roman Catholic bishop.

CANADA

(See *India; Indonesia; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

CHILE

(See also *China, Communist*)

Jan. 14—The government announces that it will nationalize the Bethlehem-Chile Iron

Mines, a subsidiary of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation of the U.S.

Jan. 28—President Salvador Allende Gossens denies that his administration is harassing the press and says that the charges are part of a malicious campaign against his government.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Jan. 5—A joint communiqué announces the establishment of diplomatic relations between Chile and Communist China.

CUBA

Jan. 27—According to Havana radio, the new Soviet Ambassador to Cuba, Nikita Tolubeyev, has presented his credentials.

ECUADOR

Jan. 16—2 tuna fishing boats whose home port is in the U.S. are strafed by unidentified fighter planes 60 miles off the coast of Ecuador; Ecuador claims a 200-mile jurisdiction off her coast.

ETHIOPIA

Jan. 18—In an interview, Emperor Haile Selassie charges that "outside nations and groups" are backing rebel guerrillas in the northern province of Eritrea.

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, E.E.C.*)

Jan. 5—The General Confederation of Labor announces that it will sign a wage pact covering 300,000 workers in the state-owned railway system. The pact, which represents a concession on the part of the government, links wages to the cost of living. President Georges Pompidou acts to increase the minimum wage 3.7 per cent.

U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad arrives for talks with French leaders on the problems of the Middle East.

Jan. 21—President Pompidou, in a news conference, says that Britain has not yet adopted a serious position in negotiating for membership in the European Economic Community.

Jan. 26—In one of their semi-annual talks, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and President Pompidou conclude their 2d day of conferences.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Jan. 29—East German Communist party leader Walter Ulbricht rejects West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's suggestions for West German-East German cooperation and asks West Germany to extend diplomatic recognition to East Germany.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See *Intl, Berlin; East Germany*)

GUINEA

Jan. 24—The National Assembly, sitting as the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal, sentences 92 persons to death, 34 in absentia, for treason for their alleged involvement in the November, 1970, invasion of Guinea.

Jan. 25—An unspecified number of the 92 persons sentenced to death yesterday are executed.

HAITI

Jan. 8—*The New York Times* reports that President François Duvalier, in his New Year's message, hinted that his son Jean Claude Duvalier will succeed him on his death.

Jan. 14—Congress unanimously approves amendments to the constitution lowering the age requirement for the presidency from 40 to 20 and giving President Duvalier the power to choose his successor.

INDIA

Jan. 3—The Samyukta Socialist party, the Old Congress party and the Jan Sangh form an alliance to oppose the New Congress party of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Jan. 9—in New Delhi, Sheik Abdullah, the leader of Kashmir's Muslims, and 2 of his aides are forbidden to return to Kash-

mir by the Kashmiri government. Yesterday, the Kashmiri government arrested more than 500 members of the Sheik's political organization.

British Prime Minister Edward Heath and Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau arrive in India to confer with Prime Minister Gandhi.

Jan. 11—Orissa state is put under the control of the central government after the collapse of the state government.

INDONESIA

Jan. 16—After the departure of Cambodian Foreign Minister Koun Wick from Jakarta, Foreign Minister Adam Malik says that Indonesia will use diplomatic channels to aid Cambodia but that no agreement on military aid has been reached.

Jan. 22—Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau begins a 3-day state visit.

IRAN

(See also *Intl, Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries*)

Jan. 24—Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi warns that Iran and 9 other oil-producing nations may cut off the supply of oil to the West if negotiations with Western oil companies break down.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Arab-Israeli Conflict*)

Jan. 12—Israeli authorities report that a ring of Arabs involved in espionage and sabotage has been rounded up in the Jerusalem area in the last 3 weeks; United Nations employees are among the 60 suspects.

JAPAN

Jan. 13—The U.S. army begins to move mustard gas from Okinawa to Johnston Island.

Jan. 16—Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S., confers with Premier Eisaku Sato; the effect of U.S. troop withdrawals from Japan is discussed.

PAKISTAN

Jan. 23—Unofficial results in the January

17 election in the districts which did not take part in the December 7 general election indicate that the Awami League has captured 9 additional seats in the new National Assembly; the Awami League will now have a majority of 21 seats.

PHILIPPINES, THE

Jan. 15—Vice President Fernando Lopez resigns his Cabinet post as Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources after President Ferdinand Marcos charges that there are connections between the Vice President and a pressure group the President claims is trying to undermine his development program.

POLAND

Jan. 10—Polish newspapers publish information about government plans to ease economic discontent; among the projected reforms is a pledge not to raise prices on non-seasonal goods for 2 years.

Jan. 11—Anton Walaszek, the Communist party chief in Szczecin Province, is dismissed.

Jan. 13—Australian Foreign Minister Rudolf Kirchschläger arrives in Poland for 3 days of political and trade talks; he confers with Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Jedrychowski.

Jan. 15—at a session of the Council of Trade Unions in Warsaw, the resignation of Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, the trade union chief, is announced; he is replaced by Wladyslaw Kruczak.

Jan. 21—Rainer Barzel, head of the Christian Democratic Union, a West German opposition party, confers with Polish leaders on the issue of ethnic German emigration.

Jan. 23—Interior Minister Kazimierz Switala resigns and is replaced by Franciszek Szlachcic.

According to *The New York Times*, Edward Gierek, the Communist party chief, has gone to the port city of Szczecin to try to halt widespread strikes.

Jan. 26—Reports in the Polish press indicate that yesterday government leaders decided

to delay the introduction of the incentive system of wage payments for a year.

SIERRA LEONE

Jan. 21—A group of students from Sierra Leone take over the High Commission of their country in London and hold 14 hostages; they are demanding the release of their leader, who is being detained in Sierra Leone.

SOUTH AFRICA

Jan. 26—In Johannesburg, because of the refusal of state witnesses to testify, the prosecutor drops all charges against 19 persons who were accused of miscegenation.

SPAIN

Jan. 12—Lieutenant General Fernando Rodriguez Cifuentes, a right-wing general, is relieved of his command in a decree signed by Generalissimo Francisco Franco.

SWITZERLAND

Jan. 3—A ruling of the Swiss Supreme Court is made public: federal tax authorities can supply information to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service about Swiss bank activities of U.S. citizens suspected of tax fraud.

THAILAND

Jan. 7—*The New York Times* reports that U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, visiting in Thailand, has promised Thai leaders that U.S. military aid to Thailand will be increased over the next 10 years.

Jan. 9—Police sources report that yesterday Thai border police captured a Communist jungle camp 5 miles from the Malaysian border.

Jan. 16—The U.S. Embassy in Bangkok announces that 5,800 U.S. servicemen were withdrawn from Thailand in the last 4 months of 1970.

UGANDA

Jan. 26—After reports of scattered fighting, it is announced over the Uganda radio that a new military government, headed by Major General Idi Amin, has been estab-

lished. President Milton Obote, returning to Uganda from the Commonwealth conference, refuses to comment.

Jan. 27—Amin charges that Tanzania is planning an attack on Uganda. Deposed President Obote has taken refuge in Tanzania.

Jan. 28—Amin dismisses Obote's Cabinet, releases 55 political prisoners, and bans political activities.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *U.A.R.*; *U.S.*, *Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 5—*Tass*, the Soviet press agency, publishes a summary of the protest (delivered to the U.S. State Department yesterday) against the harassment of Soviet representatives in the U.S. by the Jewish Defense League.

Jan. 6—Unofficial sources in the Soviet Union report that the trial of 9 Soviet Jews accused of organized anti-Soviet activity has been adjourned.

Jan. 8—Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko delivers a protest to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow against the bomb blast at the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

Jan. 10—The cars of 3 U.S. correspondents are vandalized in Moscow.

Jan. 15—U.S. Senator Edmund Muskie (D., Me.) confers with Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin at the Kremlin; the Middle East, Indochina and the possibility of improved relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are discussed.

Jan. 19—According to reports in *The New York Times*, on January 14, a Lithuanian was sentenced to death for attempting to hijack a Soviet plane to Sweden; his wife was sentenced to 3 years in a prison camp.

Jan. 21—Mstislav V. Keldysh, president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and George Low, acting administrator of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, sign an agreement for increased cooperation on space research.

Jan. 26—Official reports in the Soviet press announce the soft landing of the Soviet spacecraft *Venera 7* on Venus in December, 1970; the reports indicate that signals were returned to earth for 20 minutes.

Jan. 31—It is unofficially reported from Moscow that the Lithuanian Supreme Court has commuted the January 14 death sentence of a Lithuanian convicted of attempted hijacking.

U.A.R.

(See also *France*)

Jan. 15—President Anwar el-Sadat and Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny take part in ceremonies dedicating the Aswan High Dam.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *France*)

Jan. 4—Lord Robens, chairman of the National Coal Board, resigns in a dispute over the denationalization of enterprises under the Coal Board.

Jan. 8—A special immigration tribunal upholds the deportation order issued by the Conservative government to Rudi Dutschke, the former German radical student leader.

Jan. 12—Selwyn Lloyd, a former Conservative party Foreign Minister, is elected Speaker of the House of Commons, as Parliament reconvenes.

Jan. 13—Extra guards are placed at the homes and official residences of all Cabinet members following the bombing last night of the home of Robert Carr, Minister of Employment.

Jan. 20—A strike of British postal workers begins; telephone and cablegram service is also affected.

Northern Ireland

Jan. 18—Following the London meeting of British Home Secretary Reginald Maudling and Northern Ireland's Prime Minister James Chichester-Clark, a joint communiqué is issued voicing their determination to end the violence and rioting in Northern Ireland.

Jan. 23—Police use tear gas to disperse rioters in Belfast.

British Protectorates

Trucial States

Jan. 18—The Popular Front for the Occupied Arabian Gulf says that in December, 1970, it successfully attacked British bases at Ras al Khaima, a sheikdom that is one of the British-protected Trucial States.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Jan. 6—Under a new plan (the Rural Environmental Assistance Program), the Agriculture Department announces that farmers will continue to receive government subsidies to help pay the costs of conservation programs, but will receive greater allowances for projects with long-range or community-wide benefits.

Civil Rights and Race Relations

Jan. 4—A federal court in Philadelphia rules that the Department of Housing and Urban Development may not support housing projects through mortgage insurance or rent supplements if to do so would increase or maintain segregation unless the need for rehabilitation of a slum or for additional minority housing in slums clearly outweighs the disadvantages of perpetuating areas of racial concentrations.

Jan. 5—A federally appointed panel of labor experts finds Bethlehem Steel Corporation guilty of discrimination against Negroes through the company's seniority system.

Jan. 12—The N.A.A.C.P., in a statement issued through its chairman, Bishop Stephen G. Spottswood, charges that there is an attempt to deny a fair trial to Angela Davis by failure to presume her innocence.

Jan. 14—Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, charges that school integration is lagging in the North and West; he says that the South has made significant progress in school desegregation in the last 2 years.

Jan. 28—The United Auto Workers and the National Committee Against Discrimination file a complaint with the New Jersey State Division on Civil Rights charging that local zoning laws deprive union mem-

bers working at the Mahwah plant of the Ford Motor Company of the right to live near their work.

The Justice Department agrees to drop its suit against Samuel J. Lefrak of the Lefrak Organization in return for a pledge by the company to end discrimination in the rental of apartments.

Conservation and Pollution

(See also *Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 7—The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia orders the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, William D. Ruckelshaus, to issue immediate notification of the cancellation of all uses of DDT; he is also ordered to determine whether DDT is an "imminent hazard" and should be banned from interstate commerce.

Economy

Jan. 4—In a nationally televised program on which he was interviewed by 4 correspondents, President Richard M. Nixon forecasts a significant improvement in the economy for 1971.

Jan. 8—The Labor Department reports an increase to 6 per cent in the unemployment rate for December, 1970.

Jan. 11—The President orders a reduction in taxes paid by businesses; the \$2.6 billion tax reduction will result from a liberalization of the rules for the depreciation of equipment.

Jan. 16—The United States Steel Corporation announces price increases of about 6.8 per cent on products for major construction.

Jan. 18—The Bethlehem Steel Corporation announces that it will lower its price increase, announced on January 11, to 6.8 per cent; the previously announced increase was 12 per cent.

The Commerce Department's preliminary estimates show that the Gross National Product, stated in real terms, showed a decline in the fourth quarter of 1970 of 3.3 per cent; for the year as a whole, the decline reached 0.5 per cent.

Jan. 24—In a year-end report, the Labor Department discloses that unemployment averaged 7.6 per cent in urban poverty areas in 1970; the figure for 1969 was 5.5 per cent.

Jan. 26—On the stock market, the Dow-Jones industrial average rises to a high of 865.62, the best closing level since July 8, 1969.

Jan. 29—The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports a rise in the Consumer Price Index in December, 1970, that indicates a price rise for the country as a whole in 1970 of 5.5 per cent. 1970 was the second most inflationary year since the Korean War.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. War in Indochina; Ecuador; Thailand; U.S.R.R.*)

Jan. 3—State Department officials confirm that on December 27, 1970, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Martin J. Hillenbrand sent a letter to 14 leading Soviet scientists inviting them to attend the forthcoming trial of Angela Davis, the black Communist militant who has been charged with murder.

Jan. 4—In a televised interview, President Nixon says that the servicing of Soviet nuclear submarines "either in Cuba or from Cuba" would constitute a violation of an agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. reached in October, 1970.

Jan. 5—Following the Soviet Union's warning that Americans in the U.S.S.R. should not expect the protection of the Soviet government, the State Department says that the U.S. will hold the Soviet government responsible for the safety of U.S. citizens and establishments there.

Jan. 8—The State Department apologizes to the Soviet Union after the explosion of a small bomb outside the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

Jan. 11—The political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow delivers a protest to the Soviet government against the harassment of Americans in the U.S.S.R.

Jan. 14—A joint U.S.-Canadian commission which has been studying the pollution problems of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and

part of the St. Lawrence river for the past 6 years issues its report. The report recommends that phosphates be eliminated entirely from detergents by 1972. Canada is urged to spend nearly \$250 million and the U.S. is urged to spend \$1.5 billion for waste treatment facilities.

Jan. 16—Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin departs for Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; he bears letters to the rulers of those countries from President Nixon expressing the President's concern about the threatened world oil crisis. (See also *Intl. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.*)

Jan. 18—Secretary of State William Rogers summons Ambassador Carlos Mantilla-Ortega of Ecuador to the State Department to inform him that the U.S. is suspending all military sales, credits and guarantees to Ecuador following the seizure of 4 U.S. tuna boats off the coast of Ecuador.

Jan. 19—Rabbi Meir Kahane, leader of the Jewish Defense League, announces that his organization will halt its campaign of harassing Soviet officials and their families.

Jan. 20—State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey reveals that since January 11, Ecuador has seized 9 U.S. tuna boats and has fined them a total of \$484,600. 6 of the boats have been released, and the others are expected to be released soon.

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, at a news conference, cites the Nixon Doctrine and the military aid bill which restricted the use of U.S. ground troops—not air power—in Cambodia as the basis for the increased U.S. bombing there.

Jan. 27—The U.S. Embassy in Moscow delivers a protest to the foreign ministry of the U.S.S.R. against the 2d attack on U.S. newsmen in 3 days.

Jan. 28—Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rogers says that the administration does not intend to expand its military operations in Cambodia.

Government

Jan. 1—President Nixon signs a \$2.9-billion

housing bill which provides aid for blighted city areas and assistance for the development of new communities.

Jan. 2—The Senate passes a resolution extending for 3 months the funding for the Department of Transportation, including funds for the supersonic plane project.

John W. McCormack (D., Mass.) retires from his position as Speaker of the House and from public life.

The 91st Congress adjourns.

The President vetoes a bill that would have increased by 4 per cent the salary of the government's blue-collar workers.

The President signs a 3-year, \$3.55-billion crime control bill; a bill authorizing \$59.22 million for projects under the Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control Act of 1970; and legislation creating the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse within the National Institute of Mental Health.

Jan. 4—Dr. Melvin H. Evans is installed as the first elected Governor of the Virgin Islands.

Jan. 7—The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws issues a report in the form of a draft criminal code which calls for the abolition of capital punishment and the outlawing of private ownership of handguns.

Jan. 8—The President signs the following legislation: a bill empowering him to adjust federal pay scales annually so that they are comparable to wages offered by private industry; a bill authorizing the establishment of the Gulf Island National Seashore in Mississippi and Florida; a bill raising the pensions of former Presidents from \$25,000 to \$60,000; a bill establishing Voyageurs National Park; a bill establishing a Chesapeake and Ohio Canal National Historical Park; a bill authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to aid railroads undergoing reorganization.

Jan. 9—*The New York Times* reports that Carlos Garcia Camacho was sworn in this week as the first elected Governor of Guam.

Jan. 11—President Nixon signs legislation easing the cost of food stamps to the poor but restricting the program to families in which

able-bodied adults are willing to accept work.

The President signs a \$66.6-billion defense appropriations bill, which includes an extension of the ban on the use of U.S. ground troops in Laos and Thailand.

The President also signs a \$1.85-billion catch-all appropriations bill including a ban on sending U.S. ground troops into Cambodia.

Jan. 12—The President, through his press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, criticizes the Bethlehem Steel Corporation for its decision to raise prices; Ziegler says that the government is reviewing its policy of limiting steel imports.

6 persons, including Philip Berrigan, a Roman Catholic priest, are indicted on federal charges of plotting to blow up the heating systems of federal buildings in Washington and to kidnap Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for national security affairs; 7 others are named as co-conspirators but not defendants.

The President signs legislation extending U.S. participation in the International Coffee Agreement until June 30, 1971.

President Nixon signs a \$250-million bill authorizing easy credit sales of U.S. arms to allies in fiscal 1971; the measure includes the repeal of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

Jan. 13—The Board of Governors of the new United States Postal Service, which will take over the delivery of U.S. mail on July 1, 1971, names Postmaster General Winton Blount as head of the new service.

The Interior Department issues a report recommending the construction of an oil pipeline across Alaska although admittedly such a pipeline will create environmental damage.

Jan. 14—Speaking at the University of Nebraska, the President says that he will ask Congress to merge the Peace Corps, Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) and other federal agencies into a new volunteer service corps.

George Romney, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, orders the

suspension of that part of the home ownership program for lower income families that involves existing housing; last week, a congressional report criticized the program as tolerant of profiteering by real estate speculators and of the sale of substandard housing.

Jan. 18—President Nixon announces the recess appointment of Thomas Kleppe as head of the Small Business Administration; when the 92d Congress convenes, Kleppe will be formally nominated.

Jan. 19—For environmental reasons, President Nixon orders a halt to construction on the Cross-Florida Barge Canal.

The President issues a directive establishing the Council on International Economic Policy and names Peter Peterson as executive director; Peterson will have the additional title of assistant to the President for international economic affairs.

Jan. 19—At a party caucus in the House chamber, Democrats choose Representative Carl Albert of Oklahoma as Speaker of the House and Representative Hale Boggs of Louisiana as majority leader.

Jan. 20—Democrats and Republicans in the House agree to modify the seniority system; selection of committee chairmen will be subject to approval by party caucuses.

Jan. 21—Senator Robert C. Byrd (West Virginia) is chosen majority whip by the Democrats, defeating Senator Edward Kennedy (Mass.). Senator Hugh Scott (R., Penn.) retains his post as minority leader in the Senate.

Richard B. Russell (D., Ga.), the senior member of the Senate, dies.

Jan. 22—President Nixon delivers his State of the Union message in which he proposes passage of his revised welfare reform program, a broad program of revenue-sharing with the states and local governments, new health care programs including a \$100-million appropriation for cancer research, and reorganization of the Cabinet. The proposal to reorganize the Cabinet calls for the retention of the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense and Justice; all other departments will be consolidated into 4:

human resources, community development, natural resources and economic development. (For excerpts from the text, see pp. 171ff. of this issue.)

Jan. 26—In his first special message to the 92d Congress, the President requests prompt action on 40 items of legislation which had been submitted to the 91st Congress but had not been passed.

Jan. 28—In a message to Congress on legislation concerned with Selective Service and the military, the President asks the approval of a \$1.5-billion pay increase for servicemen.

President Nixon nominates Robert M. White as the administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Jan. 29—President Nixon sends a \$229.2-billion budget for fiscal 1972 to Congress; he terms it "expansionary but not inflationary." The deficit estimated for the 1971 fiscal year is estimated at \$18.6 billion; this is the second largest deficit since World War II. Estimated spending in the new budget is 8 per cent higher than expenditures in the 1971 budget, a rise of \$16.4 billion.

Labor

Jan. 19—In New York City, a 6-day wildcat strike (involving 85 per cent of the city's patrolmen) ends, but many of the issues remain unresolved.

Military

Jan. 6—The U.S. military command in South Vietnam makes public a program to combat drug abuse among American forces in Vietnam.

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, speaking at a news conference in Paris, says that the U.S. could conclude its combat responsibilities in South Vietnam by "midsummer."

Jan. 11—Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee signs an agreement which surrenders most of the Navy's control over the island of Culebra, which is part of Puerto Rico.

Jan. 12—Major General Carl C. Turner,

who served as Army provost marshal general until his retirement in 1968, is indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of illegal firearms transactions.

Jan. 14—Sergeant Charles E. Hutto, who had been charged with assault with intent to murder civilians at Mylai 4 (Songmy), Vietnam, on March 16, 1968, is acquitted by a court-martial.

Jan. 22—The Army dismisses all charges against the last 4 enlisted men accused of taking part in the alleged massacre at Songmy; the action leaves only 3 officers still charged with participation in the massacre.

Jan. 29—All court-martial charges against Major General Samuel W. Koster are dismissed; Koster was division commander of the troops who allegedly participated in a massacre at Mylai 4 (Songmy) on March 16, 1968.

Politics

Jan. 7—Senator George S. McGovern (S. Dak.) announces his resignation as chairman of the reform commission of the Democratic party.

Jan. 15—The Republican National Committee selects Senator Robert J. Dole (Kansas), President Nixon's choice for the post, as Republican National Chairman.

Jan. 18—Senator McGovern announces his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 1972.

Science and Space

Jan. 31—Apollo 14 heads for the moon; the astronauts experience some difficulty in linking the command ship and its lunar landing craft about 3 hours after the launching.

Supreme Court

Jan. 12—In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court rules that state and local welfare officials have the right to inspect the homes of welfare recipients and to stop paying benefits to those who refuse such inspection.

Jan. 14—In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional 2

federal laws that authorized the Post Office Department to cut off mail service to mail order houses dealing in pornography.

Jan. 20—In a unanimous decision, the Court rules that a judge may mete out a contempt sentence immediately; if he waits until the conclusion of the trial, however, another judge must deal with the charge.

Jan. 25—In a unanimous decision, the Court rules that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids hiring policies discriminating against women with young children.

URUGUAY

Jan. 8—Geoffrey Jackson, the British Ambassador to Uruguay, is kidnapped in Montevideo.

Jan. 11—A commission of Congress, representing the full Congress during its recess, grants 40 days of special emergency police powers. Terrorist attacks continue in Montevideo after a note is received from the Tupamaro guerrillas saying that the government will have to initiate negotiations.

Jan. 15—*The New York Times* reports that it has received a letter purportedly from the Tupamaros demanding \$1 million for the release of Claude L. Fly, a U.S. agricultural expert, who was kidnapped on August 7, 1970.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

Jan. 21—At the conclusion of 2 days of talks with South Vietnamese leaders in Saigon, Cambodian Premier Lon Nol says that accords have been reached on a number of issues involving the 2 nations.

YEMEN

Jan. 2—According to *The New York Times*, President Abdul Rahman Iryani presented Yemen's first permanent constitution to the National Assembly this week.

YUGOSLAVIA

Jan. 23—Officials announce a 17 per cent devaluation of the dinar.

